Research cooperation and international standards in a model of coalition stability

Resource and Energy Economics

Volumn 33, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 36-54

  Lessmann, Kai ^a   Edenhofer, Ottmar ^a  

^a POTSDAM INSTITUTE FOR CLIMATE IMPACT RESEARCH   (Germany)

Author keywords

Coalition formation; International environmental agreements; Issue linking; Non cooperative game theory; R D spillovers; Technology standards

Indexed keywords

COALITION FORMATIONS; INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS; ISSUE LINKING; NON-COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY; TECHNOLOGY STANDARDS;

ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS; GAME THEORY; INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION; PRODUCTIVITY; RESEARCH; STANDARDS;

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER;

ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS; GAME THEORY; INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT; NUMERICAL MODEL; RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT; SPILLOVER EFFECT; STANDARD (REGULATION); TRADE-ENVIRONMENT RELATIONS;

EID: 78649913450     PISSN: 09287655     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2010.01.001     Document Type: Article

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