Renegotiation-proof climate agreements with full participation: Conditions for Pareto-efficiency

Environmental and Resource Economics

Volumn 43, Issue 4, 2009, Pages 519-533

  Asheim, Geir B ^a   Holtsmark, Bjart ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OSLO   (Norway)

^b STATISTICS NORWAY   (Norway)

Author keywords

International environmental agreements; Non cooperative game theory; Pareto efficiency; Weak renegotiation proofness

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL EFFECTS; EFFICIENCY; ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS; GAME THEORY; GAS EMISSIONS; GREENHOUSE GASES; PARETO PRINCIPLE; POLLUTION CONTROL;

CLIMATE AGREEMENT; DISCOUNT FACTORS; GREENHOUSE GAS ABATEMENTS; INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS; NON-COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY; PARETO EFFICIENCY; PARETO-EFFICIENT; WEAK RENEGOTIATION PROOFNESS;

CLIMATE MODELS;

EMISSION CONTROL; ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY; GREENHOUSE GAS; INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT; NEGOTIATION PROCESS; OPTIMIZATION; PARTICIPATORY APPROACH; TRADE-OFF;

EID: 70349679078     PISSN: 09246460     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10640-008-9247-3     Document Type: Article

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