Chapter 28 The theory of international environmental agreements

Handbook of Environmental Economics

Volumn 3, Issue , 2005, Pages 1457-1516

  Barrett, Scott ^a  

^a JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

compliance; enforcement; game theory; international environmental agreements; participation

Indexed keywords

EID: 66049102031     PISSN: 15740099     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0099(05)03028-7     Document Type: Review

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