The logic of expressive collective action: When will individuals 'nail their colours to the mast'?

British Journal of Politics and International Relations

Volumn 9, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 564-581

  Jones, Philip ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BATH   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Collective action; Expressive; Instrumental

Indexed keywords

COLLECTIVE ACTION; LOGIT ANALYSIS; SOCIAL NETWORK;

EID: 35348939673     PISSN: 13691481     EISSN: 1467856X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-856X.2006.00262.x     Document Type: Article

References (92)

1. Akerlof, G. and Kranton, R. E. (2005) 'Identity and the economics of organizations', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19: 1, 9-32.
2. Aldrich, J. (1993) 'Rational choice and turnout', American Journal of Political Science, 37: 1, 246-278.
3. Andreoni, J. (1988) 'Privately provided goods in a large economy: The limits of altruism', Journal of Public Economics, 35: 1, 57-73.
4. Andreoni, J. (2001) 'The economics of philanthropy', in N. J. Smelser and P. B. Bates (eds), International Encyclopaedia of the Social and Behavioural Sciences (London: Elsevier), 11369-11376.
5. Ansolabehere, S., de Figueiredo, J. M. and Snyder J. Jr (2003) 'Why is there so little money in US Politics?', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17: 1, 105-130.
6. Barry, B. (1970) Sociologists, Economists and Democracy (London: Collier-Macmillan).
7. Bentham, J. (1948 [1789]) The Principles of Morals and Legislation (New York: Macmillan).
8. Bentley, A. (1908) The Process of Government (Evanston IL: Principia Press).
9. Brennan, G. and Hamlin, A. (1998) 'Expressive voting and electoral equilibrium', Public Choice, 95: 1-2, 149-175.
10. Brennan, G. and Hamlin, A. (2002) 'Expressive constitutionalism', Constitutional Political Economy, 13: 4, 299-311.
11. Brennan, G. and Lomasky, L. (1993) Democracy and Decision: The Pure Theory of Electoral Preference (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
12. Buchanan, J. M. (1965) 'An economic theory of clubs', Economica, 32: 125, 1-14.
13. Buchanan, J. M. (1968) The Demand and Supply of Public Goods (Chicago IL: Rand McNally).
14. Cell, C. P. (1980) 'Selective incentives versus ideological commitment: The motivation for membership in Wisconsin farm organizations', American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 62: 2, 517-524.
15. Chamberlin, J. R. (1974) 'Provision of collective goods as a function of group size', American Political Science Review, 68: 2, 707-716.
16. Collard, D. (1978) Altruism and Economy (Oxford: Martin Robertson).
17. Craig, S. C. (1987) 'The impact of congestion on local public good production', Journal of Public Economics, 33: 3, 331-353.
18. Cullis, J., Jones, P. and Lewis, A. (2006) 'Ethical investing: Where are we now?', in M. Altman (ed.), Handbook of Economic Psychology (London: M. E. Sharpe), 602-605.
19. Deci, E. L. (1971) 'Effects of externally mediated rewards on intrinsic motivation', Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 18: 1, 105-115.
20. Deci, E. L. and Ryan, R. M. (1980) 'The empirical exploration of intrinsic motivational processes', in L. Berkowitz (ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 13 (New York: Academic Press).
21. Deci, E. L. and Ryan, R. M. (1985) Intrinsic Motivation and Self Determination in Human Behavior (New York: Plenium Press).
22. Dougherty, K. L. (2003) 'Precursors of Mancur Olson', in J. Heckelman and D. Coates (eds), Collective Choice Essays in Honor of Mancur Olson (New York: Springer-Verlag), 17-32.
23. Dowding, K. (2005) 'Is it rational to vote? Five types of answers and a suggestion', British Journal of Politics & International Relations, 7: 3, 442-459.
24. Dowding, K. (2006) 'The D-Term: A reply to Stephen Parsons', British Journal of Politics & International Relations, 8: 2, 299-302.
25. Dunleavy, P. (1991) Democracy, Bureaucracy, Public Choice: Economic Explanations in Political Science (London: Harvester).
26. Esteban, J. and Ray, D. (2001) 'Collective action and the group size paradox', American Political Science Review, 95: 3, 663-672.
27. Fireman, B. and Gamson, W. D. (1979) 'Utilitarian logic in the resource mobilization perspective', in M. N. Zald and J. D. McCarthy (eds), The Dynamics of Social Movements (Cambridge MA: Winthrop Publishers), 8-44.
28. Fisher, J. and Webb, P. (2003) 'Political participation: The vocational motivations of Labour party employees', British Journal of Politics & International Relations, 5: 2, 166-187.
29. Frank, R. (1988) Passions within Reason (New York: Norton).
30. Frey, B. S. (1997) Not Just for the Money: An Economic Theory of Personal Motivation (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar).
31. Glaeser, E. L. and Schleifer, A. (1998) Not-for-Profit Entrepreneurs (Working Paper 6810) (Cambridge MA: National Bureau of Economic Research).
32. Gneezy, U. and Rustichini, A. (2000) 'Pay enough or don't pay at all', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115: 13, 791-810.
33. Grofman, B. (1993) 'Is turnout the paradox that ate rational choice theory?', in B. Grofman (ed.), Information, Participation and Choice (Ann Arbor MI: University of Michigan Press), 93-103.
34. Hansen, J. M. (1985) 'The political economy of group membership', American Political Science Review, 79: 1, 79-96.
35. Hansmann, H. B. (1980) 'The role of nonprofit enterprise', Yale Law Journal, 89, 835-898. Reprinted in S. Rose-Ackerman, The Economics of Nonprofit Institutions (New York: Oxford University Press), 57-84.
36. Head, J. G. (1962) 'Public goods and public policy', Public Finance/ Finances Publiques, 17: 3, 197-219.
37. Hudson, J. and Jones, P. (1994) 'The importance of the "ethical voter": An estimate of "altruism "', European Journal of Political Economy, 10: 3, 499-509.
38. Hudson, J. and Jones, P. (2005) '"Public goods": An exercise in calibration', Public Choice, 124: 3-4, 267-282.
39. Jennings, C. C. (1998) 'An economistic interpretation of the Northern Ireland conflict', Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 45: 3, 294-308.
40. Johansen, L. (1977) 'The theory of public goods: Misplaced emphasis', Journal of Public Economics, 7: 1, 147-152.
41. Jones, P. (2003) 'Public choice in political markets: The absence of quid pro quo', European Journal of Political Research, 42: 1, 77-93.
42. Jones, P. (2004) '"All for one and one for all": Transactions cost and collective action', Political Studies, 52: 3, 450-468.
43. Jones, P. (2005) 'Consumers of social policy: Policy design, policy response, policy approval.' Social Policy and Society, 4: 3, 237-249.
44. Jones, P. (2006) 'A public choice analysis of international co-operation', in I. Kaul and P. Conceição (eds), The New Public Finance (New York: Oxford University Press), 304-324.
45. Jones, P. R., Cullis, J. G. and Lewis, A. (1998) 'Public versus private provision of altruism: Can fiscal policy make individuals "better"people?', Kyklos, 51: 1, 3-24.
46. Jones, P. and Dawson, P. (forthcoming) '"Choice"in collective decision-making processes: Instrumental or expressive approval?', Journal of Socio-Economics.
47. Jones, P. and Hudson, J. (2000) 'Civic duty and expressive voting: Is virtue its own reward?', Kyklos, 53: 1, 3-16.
48. Jones, A. M. and Posnett, J. W. (1993) 'The economics of charity', in N. Barr and D. Whynes (eds), Current Issues In the Economics of Welfare (London: Macmillan), 130-152.
49. Jordan, G. and Maloney, W. A. (1996) 'How bumble bees fly: Accounting for public interest participation', Political Studies, 44: 4, 668-685.
50. Jordan, G. and Maloney, W. A. (1998) 'Manipulating membership: Supply-side influences on group size', British Journal of Political Science, 28: 2, 389-409.
51. Kaempfer, W. H. and Lowenburg, A. D. (1988) 'The theory of international economic sanctions: A public choice approach', American Economic Review, 78: 4, 786-793.
52. Kaul, I. and Conceição, P. (2006) The New Public Finance: Responding to Global Challenges (New York: Oxford University Press).
53. Knack, S. (2003) 'Groups, growth and trust: Cross-country evidence on the Olson and Putnam hypotheses', Public Choice, 117: 3-4, 341-355.
54. Knoke, D. (1990) Organizing for Collective Action: The Political Economies of Associations (New York: Aldine De Gruyter).
55. Körber, A. (1998) 'Why everybody loves Flipper: The political economy of the US dolphin safe laws', European Journal of Political Economy, 14: 3, 475-509.
56. Laver, M. (1997) Private Desires, Political Action (London: Sage).
57. Ledyard, J. O. (1995) 'Public goods: A survey of experimental research', in J. H. Kagel and A. E. Roth (eds), The Handbook of Experimental Economics (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press), 111-181.
58. Lee, D. R. (1988) 'Politics, ideology and the power of public choice', Virginia Law Review, 74: 2, 191-199.
59. Lowenstein, G. (1999) 'Because it is there: The challenge of mountaineering for utility theory', Kyklos, 52: 3, 315-344.
60. Lowry, R. C. (1997) 'The private production of public goods: Organizational maintenance, managers' objectives and collective goals', American Political Science Review, 91: 2, 308-323.
61. McDermott, R. (2001) 'The psychological ideas of Amos Tversky and their relevance for political science', Journal of Theoretical Politics, 13: 1, 5-33.
62. McLean, I. (1987) Public Choice: An Introduction (Oxford: Basil Blackwell).
63. McLean, I. (2001) Rational Choice and British Politics: An Analysis of Rhetoric and Manipulation from Peel to Blair (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
64. Mueller, D. (2003) Public Choice III (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
65. Musgrave, R. A. (1969) 'Provision for social goods', in J. Margolis and M. Guitton (eds), Public Economics (New York: St Martins Press), 124-144.
66. Olson, M. Jr (1965) The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press).
67. Olson, M. Jr (1982) The Rise and Decline of Nations (New Haven CT: Yale University Press).
68. Olson, M. and Zeckhauser, R. (1966) 'An economic theory of alliances', Review of Economics and Statistics, 48: 3, 266-279.
69. Olstrom, E. (2003) 'How types of goods and property rights jointly affect collective action', Journal of Theoretical Politics, 15: 3, 239-270.
70. Parsons, S. (2006) 'The rationality of voting: A response to Dowding', British Journal of Politics & International Relations, 8: 2, 295-298.
71. Putnam, R. D. (1993) Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press).
72. Roy, L. (1998) 'Why we give: Testing economic and social psychology accounts of altruism', Polity, 30: 3, 383-415.
73. Schiff, J. (1989) 'Tax policy, charitable giving and the non-profit sector: What do we really know?' in R. Magat (ed.), Philanthropic Giving (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 128-142.
74. Schuessler, A. A. (2000) A Logic of Expressive Choice (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press).
75. Scitovsky, T. (1976) The Joyless Economy: An Inquiry into Human Satisfaction and Consumer Satisfaction (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
76. Shepsle, K. A. and Bonchek, M. S. (1997) Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behaviors and Institutions (New York: Norton).
77. Silver, M. (1974) 'Political revolution and repression: An economic approach', Public Choice, 17: 1, 63-71.
78. Stigler, G. J. (1974) 'The free riders and collective action: An approach to the theories of economic regulation', The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 5: 2, 360-372.
79. Truman, D. (1951) The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion (New York: Adolph Knopf).
80. Tullock, G. (1965) 'The welfare costs of tariffs, monopolies and theft', Western Economic Journal, 5: 3, 224-232.
81. Tullock, G. (1971) 'The paradox of revolution', Public Choice, 11: 1, 89-99.
82. Tullock, G. (1973) The Economics of Charity (London: Institute of Economic Affairs).
83. Tullock, G. (1997) 'Where is the rectangle?', Public Choice, 91: 2, 149-159.
84. Tullock, G. (1998) 'Which rectangle?', Public choice, 96: 3-4, 405-410.
85. Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. (1981) 'The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice', Science, 211: 4481, 453-458.
86. Udehn, L. (1996) The Limits of Public Choice (London and New York: Routledge).
87. Van Bergeijk, P. A. G. (1994) Economic Diplomacy, Trade and Commercial Policy (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar).
88. Vitell, S. J. and Davis, D. L. (1990) 'The relationship between ethics and job satisfaction: An empirical investigation', Journal of Business Ethics, 9: 6, 489-494.
89. Wallis, J. J. (2003) 'The public promotion of private interest (groups)', in J. Heckelman and D. Coates (eds), Collective Choice Essays in Honor of Mancur Olson (New York: Springer-Verlag), 219-246.
90. Warr, P. G. (1982) 'Pareto optimal redistribution and private charity', Journal of Public Economics, 19: 1, 21-41.
91. Whiteley, P. F. and Seyd, P. (1996) 'Rationality and party activism: Encompassing tests of alternative models of political participation', European Journal of Political Research, 29: 2, 215-234.
92. Yandle, B. (1989) 'Bootleggers and Baptists in the market for regulation', in J. S. Shogren (ed.), The Political Economy of Government Regulation (London: Kluwer), 29-54.