Expressive voting and government redistribution: Testing Tullock's 'charity of the uncharitable'

Public Choice

Volumn 119, Issue 1-2, 2004, Pages 143-159

  Sobel, Russell S ^a   Wagner, Gary A ^b  

^a WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 4043071403     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/b:puch.0000024167.07573.ab     Document Type: Conference Paper

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