Voting to anger and to please others

Public Choice

Volumn 134, Issue 3-4, 2008, Pages 247-254

  Glazer, Amihai ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Candidates; Expressive voting

Indexed keywords

EID: 38749152906     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-007-9221-6     Document Type: Article

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