Party platforms with endogenous party membership

Public Choice

Volumn 117, Issue 1-2, 2003, Pages 79-98

  Poutvaara, Panu ^a  

^a Ctr for Economic Business Research   (Denmark)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 1642581452     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1026169716399     Document Type: Review

References (24)

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