Expressive and instrumental voting: The Scylla and Charybdis of Constitutional Political Economy

Constitutional Political Economy

Volumn 15, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 77-88

  Crampton, Eric ^a   Farrant, Andrew ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBURY   (New Zealand)

^b GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 4043089230     PISSN: 10434062     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/B:COPE.0000017963.81208.67     Document Type: Review

References (25)

1. Brennan, G., and Kliemt, H. (1990) "Logo Logic." Constitutional Political Economy 1(1): 125-27.
2. Brennan, G., and Buchanan, J. M. [2000 (1980)] The Power to Tax. Indianapolis: Liberty Press.
3. Brennan, G., and Hamlin, A. (2000) Democratic Devices and Desires. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
4. Brennan, G., and Hamlin, A. (2002) "Expressive Constitutionalism. " Constitutional Political Economy 13(4): 299-311.
5. Brennan, G., and Lomasky, L. (1993) Democracy and Decision: The Pure Theory of Electoral Preference. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
6. Buchanan, J. M. [2001 (1981)] "Constitutional Restrictions on the Power of Government." In: Choice, Contract, and Constitutions. Indianapolis: Liberty Press.
7. Buchanan, J. M. [2001 (1994)] "Lagged Implementation as an Element in Constitutional Strategy." In: Choice, Contract, and Constitutions. Indianapolis: Liberty Press.
8. Buchanan, J. M. [2001 (1996)] "Distributional Politics and Constitutional Design." In: Choice, Contract, and Constitutions. Indianapolis: Liberty Press.
9. Buchanan, J. M., and Tullock, G. [1997 (1962)] The Calculus of Consent. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
10. Caplan, B. (2000) "Rational Irrationality: A Framework for the Neoclassical-Behavioral Debate." Eastern Economic Journal 26(2): 191-211.
11. Caplan, B. (2001) "Rational Irrationality and the Microfoundations of Political Failure." Public Choice 107(3/4): 311-31.
12. Caplan, B. (2002) "Systematically Biased Beliefs about Economics: Robust Evidence of Judgmental Anomalies from the Survey of Americans and Economists on the Economy." Economic Journal 112: 433-58.
13. Elster, J. (2000) Ulysses Unbound. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
14. Fiorina, M. P. (1981) Retrospective Voting in American National Elections. New Haven: Yale University Press.
15. Flemming, R. B., and Wood, B. D. (1997) "The Public and the Supreme Court: Individual Justice Responsiveness to American Policy Moods." American Political Science Review 41(2): 468-98.
16. Kiewiet, D. R. (1983) Macroeconomics and Micropolitics: The Electoral Effects of Economic Issues. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
17. Levy, D. M. (1989) "The Statistical Basis of Athenian-American Constitutional Theory." Journal of Legal Studies 18(January): 79-103.
18. McGuire, R. A., and Ohsfeldt, R. L. (1986) "An Economic Model of Voting Behavior over Specific Issues at the Constitutional Convention of 1787." Journal of Economic History 46(1): 79-111.
19. McGuire, R. A., and Ohsfeldt, R. L. (1989) "Self-Interest, Agency Theory, and Political Voting Behavior: The Ratification of the United States Constitution." American Economic Review 79(1): 219-34.
20. Macaulay, T. B. [1978 (1829)] "Mill's Essay on Government: Utilitarian Logic and Politics." In: Lively, J., and Rees, J. (eds.) Utilitarian Logic and Politics: James Mill's 'Essay on Government', Macaulay's Critique, and the Ensuing Debate. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
21. Moe, T. (1990) "Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story." Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 6: 213-54.
22. Mulligan, C. B., and Hunter, C. G. (2003) "The Empirical Frequency of a Pivotal Vote." Public Choice 116(1/2): 31-54.
23. Nelson, M. (1988) "The President and the Court: Reinterpreting the Court-packing Episode of 1937." Political Science Quarterly 103(2): 267-93.
24. Paley, W. [2002 (1785)] The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy. Indianapolis: Liberty Press.
25. Tullock, G. (1987) "The Calculus after 25 years." Cato Journal 7(2): 313-21.