'All for one and one for all': Transactions cost and collective action

Political Studies

Volumn 52, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 450-468

  Jones, Philip ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BATH   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 7244258694     PISSN: 00323217     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2004.00490.x     Document Type: Review

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