How much do voters know? An analysis of motivation and political awareness

Scottish Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 55, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 123-142

  Jones, Philip ^a   Dawson, Peter ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BATH   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DECISION MAKING; ELECTORAL SYSTEM; POLITICAL PARTICIPATION; THEORETICAL STUDY; VOTING BEHAVIOR;

EID: 41749086699     PISSN: 00369292     EISSN: 14679485     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9485.2008.00447.x     Document Type: Article

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