How to Know: A Practicalist Conception of Knowledge

How to Know: A Practicalist Conception of Knowledge

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 1-260

  Hetherington, Stephen ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES   (Australia)

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EID: 79956152783     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1002/9781118083178     Document Type: Book

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