Bounded rationality

Annual Review of Political Science

Volumn 2, Issue , 1999, Pages 297-321

  Jones, Bryan D ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON   (United States)

Author keywords

Behavioral decision theory; Behavioral organization theory; Decision making; Political psychology

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033474869     PISSN: 10942939     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.2.1.297     Document Type: Article

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