The political economy of power-sharing

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 27, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 328-342

  Tridimas, George ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ULSTER   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Consociational theory; Non majoritarian institutions; Post civil war democratisation; Power sharing; Proportional representation; Risk aversion; Split the surplus formula

Indexed keywords

EID: 79954954334     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2010.10.002     Document Type: Article

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