Constitutional design for divided societies

Journal of Democracy

Volumn 15, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 96-109

  Lijphart, Arend ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

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EID: 2142768720     PISSN: 10455736     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1353/jod.2004.0029     Document Type: Article

References (30)

1. The secondary characteristics are proportionality, especially in legislative elections (in order to ensure a broadly representative legislature - similar to the aim of effecting a broadly constituted executive) and a minority veto on the most vital issues that affect the rights and autonomy of minorities.
2. Some of these scholars are Dirk Berg-Schlosser, William T. Bluhm, Laurence J. Boulle, Hans Daalder, Edward Dew, Robert H. Dix, Alan Dowty, Jonathan Fraenkel, Hermann Giliomee, Theodor Hanf, Jonathan Hartlyn, Martin O. Heisler, Luc Huyse, Thomas A. Koelble, Gerhard Lehmbruch, Franz Lehner, W. Arthur Lewis, Val R. Lorwin, Diane K. Mauzy, John McGarry, Kenneth D. McRae, Antoine N. Messarra, R.S. Milne, S.J.R. Noel, Eric A. Nordlinger, Brendan O'Leary, G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Andrew Reynolds, F. van Zyl Slabbert, Jürg Steiner, Albert J. Venter, Karl von Vorys, David Welsh, and Steven B. Wolinetz. Their most important writings on the subject (if published before the mid-1980s) can be found in the bibliography of Arend Lijphart, Power-Sharing in South Africa (Berkeley, Calif.: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1985), 137-71.
3. Ted Robert Gurr, Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitiucal Conflicts (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1993), 292, italics added.
4. I have responded to these criticisms at length elsewhere. See especially Lijphart, "The Wave of Power-Sharing Democracy," in Andrew Reynolds, ed., The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 40-47; and Lijphart, Power-Sharing in South Africa, 83-117.
5. I have responded to these criticisms at length elsewhere. See especially Lijphart, "The Wave of Power-Sharing Democracy," in Andrew Reynolds, ed., The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 40-47; and Lijphart, Power-Sharing in South Africa, 83-117.
6. Brian Barry, "The Consociational Model and Its Dangers," European Journal of Political Research 3 (December 1975): 406.
7. Donald L. Horowitz, A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1991), 188-203; and "Electoral Systems: A Primer for Decision Makers," Journal of Democracy 14 (October 2003): 122-23. In alternative-vote systems, voters are asked to rank order the candidates. If a candidate receives an absolute majority of first preferences, he or she is elected; if not, the weakest candidate is eliminated, and the ballots are redistributed according to second preferences. This process continues until one of the candidates receives a majority of the votes.
8. Donald L. Horowitz, A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1991), 188-203; and "Electoral Systems: A Primer for Decision Makers," Journal of Democracy 14 (October 2003): 122-23. In alternative-vote systems, voters are asked to rank order the candidates. If a candidate receives an absolute majority of first preferences, he or she is elected; if not, the weakest candidate is eliminated, and the ballots are redistributed according to second preferences. This process continues until one of the candidates receives a majority of the votes.
9. For a detailed critique, see Lijphart, "The Alternative Vote: A Realistic Alternative for South Africa?" Politikon 18 (June 1991): 9-101; and Lijphart, "Multiethnic Democracy," in Seymour Martin Lipset, ed., The Encyclopedia of Democracy (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1995), 863-64.
10. For a detailed critique, see Lijphart, "The Alternative Vote: A Realistic Alternative for South Africa?" Politikon 18 (June 1991): 9-101; and Lijphart, "Multiethnic Democracy," in Seymour Martin Lipset, ed., The Encyclopedia of Democracy (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1995), 863-64.
11. The alternative vote was also used for the 1982 and 1988 presidential elections in Sri Lanka and for the 2000 presidential elections in the Republika Srpska in Bosnia. Nigeria has used a similar system favored by Horowitz (requiring a plurality plus at least 25 percent of the votes in at least two-thirds of the states for victory) for its presidential elections. The third and sixth guidelines that I describe in the present essay recommend a parliamentary system without a popularly elected president-and therefore no direct presidential elections at all.
12. Benjamin Reilly has come to Horowitz's defense, but only with significant qualifications; for instance, Reilly dissents from Horowitz's advocacy of the alternative vote for the key case of South Africa. See Reilly, Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). Andreas Wimmer advocates the alternative vote for Iraq in "Democracy and Ethno-Religious Conflict in Iraq," Survival 45 (Winter 2003-2004): 111-34.
13. Benjamin Reilly has come to Horowitz's defense, but only with significant qualifications; for instance, Reilly dissents from Horowitz's advocacy of the alternative vote for the key case of South Africa. See Reilly, Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). Andreas Wimmer advocates the alternative vote for Iraq in "Democracy and Ethno-Religious Conflict in Iraq," Survival 45 (Winter 2003-2004): 111-34.
14. Donald L. Horowitz, "Constitutional Design: Proposals versus Processes," in Andrew Reynolds, ed., The Architecture of Democracy, 25.
15. In contrast with plurality, the alternative vote (instant runoff) ensures that the winning candidate has been elected by a majority of the voters, and it does so more accurately than the majority-runoff method and without the need for two rounds of voting.
16. Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 104.
17. All three of these systems use multimember election districts. The cumulative vote resembles multi-member district plurality in which each voter has as many votes as there are seats in a district, but, unlike plurality, the voter is allowed to cumulate his or her vote on one or a few of the candidates. In limited-vote systems, voters have fewer votes than the number of district seats. The single nontransferable vote is a special case of the limited vote in which the number of votes cast by each voter is reduced to one.
18. See Matthew Soberg Shugart and Martin P. Wattenberg, eds., Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: The Best of Both Worlds? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
19. This estimate is based on the T=75%(M+1) equation - in which T is the effective threshold and M the number of representatives elected in a district - suggested by Rein Taagepera; see Arend Lijphart, "Electoral Systems," in Seymour Martin Lipset, ed., Encyclopedia of Democracy, 417. There is considerable variation around the average of 8 representatives per district, but 9 of the 17 districts are very close to this average, with between 6 and 9 seats. The open-list rules are very complex and, in my opinion, make the lists too open. In addition to the 175 seats described here, Greenland and the Faeroe Islands elect two representatives each. I should also point out that my recommendation of the Danish model entails a bit of a paradox: It is a system that is very suitable for ethnically and religiously divided countries, although Denmark itself happens to be one of the most homogeneous countries in the world.
20. Parties below the 2 percent threshold may still benefit from the compensatory seats if certain other requirements are met, such as winning at least one district seat.
21. Juan J. Linz, "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?" in Juan J. Link and Arturo Valenzuela, eds., The Failure of Presidential Democracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 18.
22. Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Indispensability of Political Parties," Journal of Democracy 11 (January 2000): 48-55; E.E. Schattschneider, Party Government (New York: Rinehart, 1942), 1.
23. Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Indispensability of Political Parties," Journal of Democracy 11 (January 2000): 48-55; E.E. Schattschneider, Party Government (New York: Rinehart, 1942), 1.
24. John T.S. Keeler and Martin A. Schain, "Institutions, Political Poker, and Regime Evolution in France," in Kurt von Mettenheim, ed., Presidential Institutions and Democratic Politics: Comparing Regional and National Contexts (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 95-97. Horowitz favors a president elected by the alternative vote or a similar vote-pooling method, but in other respects his president does not differ from presidents in pure presidential systems; see his A Democratic South Africa?, 205-14.
25. John T.S. Keeler and Martin A. Schain, "Institutions, Political Poker, and Regime Evolution in France," in Kurt von Mettenheim, ed., Presidential Institutions and Democratic Politics: Comparing Regional and National Contexts (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 95-97. Horowitz favors a president elected by the alternative vote or a similar vote-pooling method, but in other respects his president does not differ from presidents in pure presidential systems; see his A Democratic South Africa?, 205-14.
26. Scholars have also indicated methods to minimize the problem of presidential-legislative deadlock-for instance, by holding presidential and legislative elections concurrently and electing the president by plurality instead of the more usual majority-runoff method. Such measures may indeed be able to ameliorate the problem to some extent, but cannot solve it entirely. See Matthew Soberg Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); and Mark P. Jones, Electoral Laws and the Survival of Presidential Democracies (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995).
27. Scholars have also indicated methods to minimize the problem of presidential-legislative deadlock-for instance, by holding presidential and legislative elections concurrently and electing the president by plurality instead of the more usual majority-runoff method. Such measures may indeed be able to ameliorate the problem to some extent, but cannot solve it entirely. See Matthew Soberg Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); and Mark P. Jones, Electoral Laws and the Survival of Presidential Democracies (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995).
28. The 1998 Good Friday Agreement provides for a similar power-sharing executive for Northern Ireland.
29. In my comparative study of the world's stable democracies, defined as countries that were continuously democratic from 1977 to 1996 (and had populations greater than 250,000), 30 of the 36 stable democracies had parliamentary systems. See Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999).
30. This pattern was discovered by Rein Taagepera; see his "The Size of National Assemblies," Social Science Research 1 (December 1972): 385-40.