Coalition governments in a model of parliamentary democracy

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 24, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 554-561

  Bandyopadhyay, Siddhartha ^a   Oak, Mandar P ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ADELAIDE   (Australia)

Author keywords

Coalitions; Ideology; Rents

Indexed keywords

EID: 49449101641     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2007.06.010     Document Type: Article

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