Constitutional judicial review and political insurance

European Journal of Law and Economics

Volumn 29, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 81-101

  Tridimas, George ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ULSTER   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Binary choice closed agenda; Constitutional judicial review; Judicial dispute resolution; Judicial independence; Political insurance

Indexed keywords

EID: 74149088819     PISSN: 09291261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10657-009-9112-z     Document Type: Review

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