An economic approach to analyzing civil wars

Economics of Governance

Volumn 9, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 25-44

  Skaperdas, Stergios ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Anarchy; Appropriation; Conflict; Incomplete contracting; Shadow of the future; Warlords

Indexed keywords

EID: 36749057842     PISSN: 14356104     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10101-007-0043-2     Document Type: Article

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