The effects of alternative power-sharing arrangements: Do "moderating" institutions moderate party strategies and government policy outputs?

Public Choice

Volumn 131, Issue 3-4, 2007, Pages 413-434

  Merrill III, Samuel ^a,b   Adams, James ^c  

^a WILKES UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b University of California ^*  (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Formateur; Nash equilibrium; Party strategy; Power sharing; Spatial model

Indexed keywords

EID: 34250796130     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-006-9123-z     Document Type: Review

References (50)

1. Abney, R., Morrison, A., & Stradiotto, G. (2006). On the stability of representation: A cross-national study of the dispersion of parties' policy positions in plurality and proportional representation systems. Typescript.
2. Adams, J., & Merrill, S. III (1999). Modeling party strategies and policy representation in multiparty elections: Why are strategies so extreme? American Journal of Political Science, 43, 765-791.
3. Adams, J., & Merrill, S. III (2006). Policy-seeking parties in a parliamentary democracy with proportional representation: A valence-uncertainty model. Typescript: University of California, Davis.
4. Adams, J., Merrill, S. III, & Grofman, B. (2005). A unified theory of party competition: A cross-national analysis integrating spatial and behavioral factors, Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
5. Alvarez, M., & Nagler, J. (1998). When politics and models collide: Estimating models of multiparty elections. American Journal of Political Science, 42, 55-96.
6. Anderson, C., & Guillory, C. (1997). Political institutions and satisfaction with democracy: A cross-national analysis of consensus and majoritarian systems. American Political Science Review, 91(1), 66-81.
7. Andrews, J., & Money, J. (2006). The spatial structure of party competition: Two-party versus multi-party systems. Presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, August 31-September 6.
8. Arrow, K., & Hahn, F.H. (1971). General competitive analysis. San Francisco: Holden-Day.
9. Baron, D., & Ferejohn, J. (1989). Bargaining in legislatures. American Political Science Review, 83, 1181-1206.
10. Browne, E., & Franklin, M. (1973). Aspects of coalition payoffs in European parliamentary democracies. American Political Science Review, 67, 453-469.
11. Brams, S., & Merrill, S. III (1983). Equilibrium strategies for final-offer arbitration: There is no median convergence. Management Science. 29, 927-941.
12. Brams, S.,& Merrill, S. III (1991). Final-offer arbitration with a bonus. European Journal of Political Economy, 7, 79-92.
13. Budge, I., Klingemann, H.-D., Volkens, A., Bara, J., & Tanenbaum, E. (2001). Mapping policy preferences: Estimates for parties, electors, and governments 1945-1998. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
14. Budge, I., & McDonald, M. (2006). Choices parties define: Policy alternatives in representative elections - 17 countries, 1945-98. Party Politics, 12, 451-466.
15. Calvert, R. (1985). Robustness of the multidimensional voting model: Candidates, motivations, uncertainty, and convergence. American Journal of Political Science, 29, 69-95.
16. Cox, G. (1997). Making votes count: Strategic coordination in the world's electoral systems. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
17. Dalton, R. (1985). Political parties and political representation. Comparative Political Studies, 17, 267-299.
18. Diermeier, D., & Merlo, A. (2004). An empirical investigation of coalitional bargaining procedures. Journal of Public Economics, 88(3-4), 783-797.
19. Dow, J. (2001). A comparative spatial analysis of majoritarian and proportional systems. Electoral Studies, 9, 109-125.
20. Downs, A. (1957). An economic theory of democracy. New York: Harper and Row.
21. Ezrow, L. (2005). Parties' policy positions and the dog that didn't bark: No evidence that disproportionality affects parties' policy positions. Presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, April 7-10.
22. Gamson, W. (1961). A theory of coalition formation. American Sociological Review, 26, 373-382.
23. Grofman, B. (1985). The neglected role of the status quo in models of issue voting. Journal of Politics, 47(2), 230-237.
24. Groseclose, T. (2001). A model of candidate location when one candidate has a valence advantage. American Journal of Political Science, 45, 862-886.
25. Hinich, M., Henning, C., & Shikano, S. (2004). Proximity versus directional models of voting: Different results but one theory. Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society, March 11-14, Baltimore, MD.
26. Huber, J. (1996). The vote of confidence in parliamentary democracies. American Political Science Review, 90, 269-282.
27. Huber, J., & Powell, G. B. (1994). Congruence between citizens and legislators in two visions of liberal democracy. World Politics, 46, 291-326.
28. Iversen, T. (1994). The logics of electoral politics: Spatial, directional, and mobilizational effects. Comparative Political Studies, 27, 155-189.
29. Kedar, O. (2005). When moderate voters prefer extreme parties: Policy balancing in parliamentary elections. American Political Science Review, 99(2), 185-199.
30. Laver, M., & Budge, I. (Eds.) (1992). Party policy and government coalitions. New York: St. Martin's.
31. Laver, M., & Shepsle, K. (Eds.) (1994). Cabinet ministries and parliamentary government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
32. Laver, M., & Shepsle, K. (1996). Making and breaking governments, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
33. Lijphart, A. (1984). Democracies: patterns of majoritarian and consensus government in twenty-one countries. New Haven: Yale University Press.
34. Lijphart, A. (1999). Patterns of democracy: government forms and performance in thirty-six societies. New Haven: Yale University Press.
35. Londregan, J., & Romer, T. (1993). Polarization, incumbency, and the personal vote. In W.A. Barnett, M. Hinich, & N. Schofield (Eds.), Political economy: Institutions, competition, and representation. New York: Cambridge University Press.
36. McDonald, M., & Budge, I. (2006). Elections, parties, and democracy: Conferring the median mandate. Oxford University Press.
37. McDonald, M., Mendes, S., & Budge, I. (2004). What are elections for? Conferring the median mandate. British Journal of Political Science, 34(1), 1-26.
38. Merrill, S. III, & Adams, J. (2001). Computing Nash equilibria in probabilistic, multiparty spatial models with non-policy components. Political Analysis, 9, 347-361.
39. Morel li, M. (2004). Party formation and policy outcomes under different electoral systems. Review of Economic Studies, 71(3), 829-853.
40. Powell, G. B. (2000). Elections as instruments of democracy: Majoritarian and proportional visions. New Haven: Yale University Press.
41. Roemer, J. (2001). Political Competition: Theory and applications. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
42. Sartori, G. (1968). Representational systems. International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 13, 470-475.
43. Schofield, N. (1993). Political competition and multiparty coalition government. European Journal of Political Research, 23, 575-594.
44. Schofield, N. (2005). The median voter theorem under proportional and plurality rule. Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society, New Orleans, LA, March 10-13.
45. Smirnov, O., & Fowler, J. (forthcoming). Moving with the mandate: Policy-motivated parties in dynamic political competition. Journal of Theoretical Politics.
46. Taagepera, R., & Shugart, M. (1989). Seats and votes: The effects and determinants of electoral systems. New Haven: Yale University Press.
47. Warwick, P. (2001). Coalition policies in parliamentary democracies: Who gets how much and why. Comparative Political Studies, 34(10), 1212-1236.
48. Wittman, D. (1973). Parties as utility maximizers. American Political Science Review, 67, 490-498.
49. Wittman, D. (1977). Candidates with policy preferences: A dynamic model. Journal of Economic Theory, 14, 180-189.
50. Wittman, D. (1983). Candidate motivation: A synthesis of alternatives. American Political Science Review, 77, 142-157.