Bringing back leviathan into social dilemmas

New Issues and Paradigms in Research on Social Dilemmas

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages 93-123

  Shinada, Mizuho ^a   Yamagishi, Toshio ^a  

^a HOKKAIDO UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 79951695971     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1007/978-0-387-72596-3_7     Document Type: Chapter

References (170)

1. Adams, J. S. (1963). Toward an understanding of inequity. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 67, 422-436.
2. Akerlof, G. (1980). A theory of social custom, of which unemployment may be one consequence. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 94, 749-775.
3. Anderson, C. M., Putterman, L. (2006). Do non-strategic sanctions obey the law of demand? The demand for punishment in the voluntary contribution mechanism. Games and Economic Behavior, 54, 1-24.
4. Andreoni, J., Harbaugh, W., Vesterlund, L. (2003). The carrot or the stick: Rewards, punishments, and cooperation. American Economic Review, 93, 893-902.
5. Axelrod, R., Hamilton, W. D. (1981). The evolution of cooperation. Science, 211, 1390-1396.
6. Axelrod, R. (1986). An evolutionary approach to norms. American Political Science Review, 80, 1095-1111.
7. Bandula, A. (1969). Principles of Behavior Modification. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
8. Barr, A. (June 2001). Social dilemmas and shame-based sanctions: Experimental results from rural Zimbabwe (The Centre for the Study of African Economies Working Paper Series, #149).
9. Barron, J. M., Gjerde, K. P. (1997). Peer pressure in an agency relationship. Journal of Labor Economics, 15, 234-254.
10. Bell, P. A., Petersen, T. R., Hautaluoma, J. E. (1989). The effect of punishment probability on overconsumption and stealing in a simulated commons. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 19, 1483-1495.
11. Bernhard, H., Fischbacher, U., Ernst, F. (2006). Parochial altruism in humans. Nature, 442, 912-915.
12. Bettenhausen, K. L., Murnighan, J. K. (1985). The emergence of norms in competitive decisionmaking groups. Administrative Science Quarterly, 30, 350-372.
13. Bettenhausen, K. L., Murnighan, J. K. (1991). The development of an intragroup norm and the effects of interpersonal and structural challenges. Administrative Science Quarterly, 36, 20-35.
14. Bixenstine, V. E., Douglas, J. (1967). Effect of psychopathology on group consensus and cooperative choice in a six-person game. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 5, 32-37.
15. Bixenstine, V. E., Levitt, C. A., Wilson, K. R. (1966). Collaboration among six persons in a prisoner's dilemma game. Conflict Resolution, 10, 488-496.
16. Blau, P. M. (1964). Exchange and Power in Social Life. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.
17. Bochet, O., Page, T., Putterman, L. (2006). Communication and punishment in voluntary contribution experiments. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 60, 11-26.
18. Bolton, G. E. (1998). Bargaining and dilemma games: From experimental data towards theoretical synthesis. Experimental Economics, 1, 257-281.
19. Bonacich, P., Shure, G. H., Kahan, J. P., Meeker, R. J. (1976). Cooperation and group size in the N-person prisoner's dilemma. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 20, 687-705.
20. Boone, C., De Brabander, B., Van Witteloostuijn, A. (1999). The impact of personality on behavior in five prisoner's dilemma games. Journal of Economic Psychology, 20, 343-377.
21. Bornstein, G., Ben-Yossef, M. (1994). Cooperation in intergroup and single-group social dilemmas. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 30, 52-57.
22. Bowles, S., Carpenter, J., Gintis, H. (2001). Mutual monitoring in teams: The effects of residual claimancy and reciprocity (Santa Fe Institute working paper #98-08-074E).
23. Bowles, S., Gintis, H. (2003). Prosocial emotions (Santa Fe Institute working paper #02-07-028).
24. Boyd, R., Gintis, H., Bowles, S., Richerson, P. J. (2003). The evolution of altruistic punishment. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 100, 3531-3535.
25. Brandt, H., Sigmund, K. (2005). Indirect reciprocity, image scoring, and moral hazard. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 102, 2666-2670.
26. Brandts, J., Charness, G. (2000). Hot vs.cold: Sequential responses and preference stability in experimental games. Experimental Economics, 2, 227-238.
27. Brechner, K. C. (1977). An experimental analysis of social traps. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 14, 552-564.
28. Brewer, M. B., Kramer, R. M. (1986). Choice behavior in social dilemmas: Effects of social identity, group size, and decision framing. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 50, 543-549.
29. Caldwell, M. D. (1976). Communication and sex effects in a five-person prisoner's dilemma game. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 33, 273-280.
30. Camerer, C. (2003). Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
31. Cameron, L. (1999). Raising the stakes in the ultimatum game: Experimental evidence from Indonesia. Economic Inquiry, 37, 47-59.
32. Carpenter, J., Matthews, P. (2002). Social reciprocity (Middlebury College Department of Economics working paper).
33. Carpenter, J. (forthcoming-a). The demand for punishment. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization.
34. Carpenter, J. (forthcoming-b). Punishing free-riders: How group size affects mutual monitoring and the provision of public goods. Games and Economic Behavior.
35. Carpenter, J., Matthews, P., Ong'Ong'a, O. (2004). Why punish? Social reciprocity and the enforcement of prosocial norms. Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 14, 407-429.
36. Casari, M. (2005). On the design of peer punishment experiments. Experimental Economics, 8, 107-115.
37. Cason, T., Mui, V. (1998). Social influence in the sequential dictator game. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 42, 248-265.
38. Cass, R., Edney, I. I. (1978). The commons dilemma: A simulation testing the effects of resource visibility and territorial division. Human Ecology, 6, 371-386.
39. Chamberlin, E. H. (1948). An experimental imperfect market. Journal of Political Economy, 56, 95-108.
40. Cinyabuguma, M., Page, T., Putterman, L. (2006). Can second-order punishment deter perverse punishment? Experimental Economics, 9, 265-279.
41. Crowe, B. L. (1969). The tragedy of the commons revisited. Science, 166, 1103-1107.
42. Danheiser, P. R., Graziano, W. G. (1982). Self-monitoring and cooperation as a self-presentational strategy. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 42, 497-505.
43. Dawes, R. M. (1980). Social dilemmas. Annual Review of Psychology, 31, 169-193.
44. Dawes, R. M., McTavish, J., Shaklee, H. (1977). Behavior, communication and assumptions about other people's behavior in a commons dilemma situation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35, 1-11.
45. Dawes, R. M., Orbell, J. M., Van de Kragt, A. (1986). Organizing groups for collective action. American Political Science Review, 80, 1171-1185.
46. De Cremer, D., Snyder, M., Dewitte, S. (2001). "The less I trust, the less I contribute (or not) ?" The effects of trust, accountability and self-monitoring in social dilemmas. European Journal of Social Psychology, 31, 93-107.
47. Deci, E. L., Ryan, R. M. (1985). Intrinsic Motivation and Self-Determination in Human Behavior. New York: Plenum Press.
48. Dollard, J., Doob, L., Miller, N. E., Mowrer, H. O., Sears, R. R. (1939). Frustration and Aggression. New York: Yale University Press.
49. Edney J. J., Harper, C. S. (1978). The commons dilemma: A review of contributions from psychology. Environmental Management, 2, 491-507.
50. Eek, D., Loukopoulos, P., Fujii, S., Gärling, T. (2002). Spill-over effects of intermittent costs for defection in social dilemmas. European Journal of Social Psychology, 32, 801-813.
51. Emerson, R. (1972). Exchange theory, Part I: A psychological basis for social exchange. Part II: Exchange relations and networks. In J. Berger, M. Zelditch Jr. & Anderson, B. (eds.), Sociological Theories in Progress (pp. 38-83). Boston: Houghton-Mifflin.
52. Falk, A., Fehr, E., Fischbacher, U. (2005). Driving forces of informal sanctions. Econometrica, 73, 2017-2030.
53. Falk, A., Fischbacher, U. (2006). A theory of reciprocity. Games and Economic Behavior, 54, 293-315.
54. Fehr, E., Fischbacher, U. (2003). The nature of human altruism: Proximate patterns and evolutionary origins. Nature, 425, 785-791.
55. Fehr, E., Fischbacher, U. (2004). Third-party punishment and social norms. Evolution and Human Behavior, 25, 63-87.
56. Fehr, E., Fischbacher, U., Gächter, S. (2002). Strong reciprocity, human cooperation and the enforcement of social norms. Human Nature, 13, 1-25.
57. Fehr, E., Gächter, S. (2000). Cooperation and punishment in public goods experiments. American Economic Review 90, 980-994.
58. Fehr, E., Gächter, S. (2002). Altruistic punishment in humans. Nature, 415, 137-140.
59. Fehr, E., Schmidt, K. M. (1999). A theory of fairness, competition and cooperation, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114, 817-868.
60. Fehr, E., Tougareva, E., Fischbacher, U. (2002). Do high stakes and competition undermine fairness? Evidence from Russia (Working paper No. 120, University of Zurich).
61. Fox, D. R. (1985). Psychology, ideology, utopia, and the commons. American Psychologist, 40, 48-58.
62. Fox, J., Guyer, M. (1977). Group size and others' strategy in an N-person game. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 21, 323-338.
63. Gardner, R., Ostrom, E., Walker, J. (1990). The nature of common-pool resource problems. Rationality and Society, 2, 335-358.
64. Gintis, H. (2000). Strong reciprocity and human society. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 206, 169-179.
65. Goehring, D. J., Kahan, J. P. (1976). The uniform n-person prisoner's dilemma game. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 20, 111-128.
66. Goette, L., Huffman, D., Meier, S. (2006). The impact of group membership on cooperation and norm enforcement: Evidence using random assignment to real social groups. American Economic Review, 96, 212-216.
67. Goren, H., Bornstein, T., Kugler, T. (July 2005). The effect of punishment on cooperation in single-group and inter-group social dilemmas. Paper presented at the 11th International Conference of Social Dilemma, Krakow, Poland.
68. Guth, W., Schmittberger, R., Schwarze, B. (1982). An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 3, 37-88.
69. Hamburger, H. (1974). Take-some: A format and family of games. Behavioral Science, 19, 28-34.
70. Hamburger, H., Guyer, M., Fox, J. (1975). Group size and cooperation. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 19, 503-531.
71. Hamilton, W. D. (1964). The genetical evolution of social behaviour. I and II. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 7, 1-16;17-32.
72. Hardin, G. (1968). The tragedy of the commons. Science, 162, 1243-1248.
73. Hardin, G. (1977). Rewards of pejoristic thinking. In G. Hardin & J. Baden (eds.), Managing the Commons (pp. 126-134). San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.
74. Hertwig, R., Ortmann, A. (2001). Experimental practices in economics: A methodological challenge for psychologists? Behavioral and Brain Science, 24, 383-451.
75. Hobbes, T. (1651). Leviathan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
76. Hollander, H. (1990). Social exchange approach to voluntary cooperation. American Economic Review, 80, 1157-1167.
77. Homans, G. C. (1961). Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms. New York: Harcourt Brace.
78. Isaac, M., Walker, J. (1988). Group size effects in public goods provision: The voluntary contribution mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 103, 179-199.
79. Isaac, M., Walker, J., Williams, A. (1994). Group size and the voluntary provision of public goods. Journal of Public Economics, 54, 1-36.
80. Isaac, R. M., Walker, J., Thomas, S. (1984). Divergent evidence on free-riding: An experimental examination of possible explanations. Public Choice, 43, 113-150.
81. Jerdee, T. H., Rosen, B. (1974). Effects of opportunity to communicate and visibility of individual decisions on behavior in the common interest. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 21, 190-197.
82. Kagel, J. H., Roth, A. E. (eds.) (1995). Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
83. Kandel, E., Lazear, E. (1992). Peer pressure and partnerships. Journal of Political Economy, 100, 801-817.
84. Kelley, H. H., Grzelak, J. (1972). Conflict between individual and common interest in an N-person relationship. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 21, 190-197.
85. Kelley, H. H., Stahelski, A. J. (1970). Social interaction basis of cooperators' and competitors' beliefs about others. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 16, 66-91.
86. Kelman, H. C. (1967). Human use of human subjects: The problem of deception in social psychological experiments. Psychological Bulletin, 67, 1-11.
87. Kerr, N. L., Brunn, S. E. (1983). Dispensability of member effort and group motivation losses: Free-rider effects. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 44, 78-94.
88. Kerr, N. L. (1989). Illusions of efficacy: The effects of group size on perceived efficacy in social dilemmas. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 25, 287-313.
89. Kiyonari, T., Barclay, P., Wilson, M., Daly, M. (2005). Do second-order sanctions solve the second-order free rider problem? Manuscript in preparation.
90. Kiyonari, T., van Veelen, M., Yamagishi, T. (2007). Can second-order punishment solve the puzzle of human cooperation in one-shot games? Paper submitted for publication.
91. Kollock, P. (1998). Social dilemmas: The anatomy of cooperation. Annual Review of Sociology, 24, 183-214.
92. Komorita, S., Barth, J. M. (1985). Components of reward in social dilemmas. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 48, 364-373.
93. Komorita, S. S., Sweeney, J., Kravitz, D. A. (1980). Cooperative choice in the n-person dilemma situation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 38, 504-516.
94. Kramer, R. M., Brewer, M. B. (1984). Effects of group identity on resource use in a simulated commons dilemma. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 46, 1044-1057.
95. Kurzban, R., Houser, D. (2001). Individual differences in cooperation in a circular public goods game. European Journal of Personality, 15, S37-S52.
96. Ledyard, J. (1995). Public goods: A survey of experimental research. In J. Kagel & A. Roth (eds.), The Handbook of Experimental Economics (pp. 111-194). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
97. Lepper, M. R., Greene, D., Nisbett, R. E. (1973). Undermining children's intrinsic interest with extrinsic reward: A test of the overjustification hypothesis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 29, 129-137.
98. Levine, D. K. (1998). Modeling altruism and spitefulness in experiments. Review of Economic Dynamics, 1, 593-622.
99. Liebrand, W. B., Jansen, R. W., Rijken, V. M., Shure, C. J. (1986). Might over morality: Social values and the perception of other players in experimental games. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 22, 203-215.
100. Loukopoulos, P., Eek, D., Gärling, T., Fujii, S. (2006). Palatable punishment in real-world social dilemmas? Punishing others increase cooperation among the unpunished. Journal of Applied Psychology, 36, 1274-1279.
101. Lynn, M., Oldenquist, A. (1986). Egoistic and nonegoistic motives in social dilemmas. American Psychologist, 41, 529-534.
102. Marwell, G., Ames, R. (1979). Experiments in the provision of public goods, I: Resources, interest, group size and the free rider problem. American Journal of Sociology, 84, 1335-1360.
103. Marwell, G., Ames, R. (1980). Experiments on the provision of public goods, II: Provision points, stakes, experience and the free rider problem. American Journal of Sociology, 85, 926-937.
104. Marwell, G., Schmitt, D. R. (1972). Cooperation in a three-person prisoner's dilemma. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 21, 376-383.
105. Masclet, D., Noussair, C., Tucker, S., Villeval, M. (2003). Monetary and nonmonetary punishment in the voluntary contributions mechanism. American Economic Review, 93, 366-380.
106. McClintock, C. G., Liebrand, W. B. G. (1988). Role of interdependence structure, individual value orientation, and another's strategy in social decision making: A transformal analysis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 55, 396-409.
107. McCusker, C., Carnevale, P. J. (1995). Framing in resource dilemmas: Loss aversion and the moderating effects of sanctions. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 61, 190-201.
108. Messick, D. M. (1999). Alternative logics for decision making in social settings. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 39, 11-28.
109. Messick, D. M., Brewer, M. B. (1983). Solving social dilemmas. Review of Personality and Social Psychology, 4, 11-44.
110. Messick, D. M., McClelland, C. L. (1983). Social traps and temporal traps. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 9, 105-110.
111. Messick, D. M., Wilke, H., Brewer, M. B., Kramer, R. M. (1983). Interpersonal relations and group processes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 44, 294-309.
112. Milinski, M., Semmann, D., Bakker, T. C. M., Krambeck, H. (2001). Cooperation through indirect reciprocity: Image scoring or standing strategy? Proceedings of the Royal Society of London Series B: Biological Sciences, 268, 2495-2501.
113. Millenson, J. R. (1967). Principles of Behavioral Analysis. New York: Macmillan.
114. Mulder, L. B., van Dijk, E., De Cremer, D., Wilke, H. (2003). Sanctioning systems in social trilemmas. Paper presented at the 10th International Conference on Social Dilemmas.
115. Mulder, L. B., Van Dijk, E., De Cremer, D., Wilke, H. (2006). Undermining trust and cooperation: The paradox of sanctioning systems in social dilemmas. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 42, 147-162.
116. Nikiforakis, N. S. (March 2004). Punishment and counter-punishment in public goods games: Can we still govern ourselves? (University of London, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway Discussion Paper Series No. dpe04/5).
117. Noussair, C., Tucker, S. (2005). Combining monetary and social sanctions to promote cooperation. Economic Inquiry, 43, 649-660.
118. Nowak, M. A., Sigmund, K. (1998). Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoring. Nature, 393, 573-577.
119. Ohmura, Y., Yamagishi, T. (2005). Why do people reject unintended inequity? Responders' rejection in a truncated ultimatum game. Psychological Reports, 96, 533-541.
120. Oliver, P. (1980). Rewards and punishments as selective incentives for collective action: Theoretical investigations. American Journal of Sociology, 85, 1356-1375.
121. Olson, M. (1965). The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
122. Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. New York: Cambridge University Press.
123. Ostrom, E., Walker, J., Gardner, R. (1992). Covenants with and without a sword: Self-governance is possible. American Political Science Review, 86, 404-417.
124. Page, T., Putterman, L., Unel, B. (2005). Voluntary association in public goods experiments: Reciprocity, mimicry and efficiency. The Economic Journal, 115, 1032-1053.
125. Platt, J. (1973). Social traps. American Psychologist, 28, 641-651.
126. Price, M. E., Cosmides, L., Tooby, J. (2002). Punitive sentiment as an anti-free rider psychological device. Evolution and Human Behavior, 23, 203-231.
127. Pruitt, D. G., Kimmel, M. J. (1977). Twenty years of experimental gaming: Critique, synthesis, and suggestions for the future. Annual Review of Psychology, 28, 363-392.
128. Rabin, M. (1993). Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics. American Economic Review, 83, 1281-1302.
129. Rabin, M. (1998). Psychology and economics. Journal of Economic Literature, 35, 11-46.
130. Rapoport, A., Au, W. T. (2001). Bonus and penalty in common pool resource dilemmas under uncertainty. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 85, 135-165.
131. Rapoport, A., Chammah, A., Dwyer, C. A., Gyr, J. (1962). Three-person non-zero-sum nonnegotiable games. Behavioral Science, 7, 38-58.
132. Samuelson, P., Nordhaus, W. (1985). Economics. New York: McGraw-Hill.
133. Sato, K., Yamagishi, T. (1986). Two psychological factors in the problem of public goods. Japanese Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 26, 89-95 (in Japanese).
134. Sato, K. (1987). Distribution of the cost of maintaining common resources. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 23, 19-31.
135. Sato, K. (1988). Trust and group size in a social dilemma. Japanese Psychological Research, 30, 88-93 (in Japanese).
136. Sefton, M., Shupp, R., Walker, J. (2002). The effect of rewards and sanctions in provision of public goods (The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics working paper no. 2002-2).
137. Shinada, M., Yamagishi, T. (In Press), Punishing free-riders: Direct and indirect promotion of cooperation. Evolution and Human Behavior.
138. Shinada, M., Yamagishi, T., Ohmura, Y. (2004). False friends are worse than bitter enemies: "Altruistic" punishment of in-group members. Evolution and Human Behavior, 25, 379-393.
139. Shinada, M., Yamagishi, T., Yamamoto, Y. (July 2005). Third-party punishment of in-group and out-group members. Paper presented at the 11th International Conference of Social Dilemma, Krakow, Poland.
140. Skinner, B. F. (1938). The Behavior of Organisms. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
141. Sobel, J. (2005). Interdependent preferences and reciprocity. Journal of Economic Literature, 43, 392-436.
142. Stern, P. C. (1976). Effect of incentives and education on resource conservation decisions in a simulated commons dilemma. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 34, 1285-1292.
143. Stillman, P. G. (1975). The tragedy of the commons: A re-analysis. Alternatives, 4, 12-15.
144. Stroebe, W., Frey, B. S. (1982). Self-interest and collective action: The economics and psychology of public goods. British Journal of Social Psychology, 21, 121-137.
145. Sweeney, J. W. (1973). An experimental investigation of the free-rider problem. Social Science Research, 2, 227-292.
146. Takahashi, N., Mashima, R. (2003). The emergence of indirect reciprocity: Is the standing strategy the answer? (21st Century "Center for the Study of Cultural and Ecological Foundations of the Mind" Working Paper Series No. 29).
147. Taylor, M. (1976). Anarchy and Cooperation. New York: Wiley.
148. Taylor, M. (1982). Community, Anarchy and Liberty. New York: Cambridge University Press.
149. Tenbrunsel, A. E., Messick, D. M. (1999). Sanctioning systems, decision frames, and cooperation. Administrative Science Quarterly, 44, 684-707.
150. Trivers, R. (1971). The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Quarterly Review of Biology, 46, 35-57.
151. Tullock, G. (1977). The social costs of reducing social cost. In G. Hardin & J. Baden (eds.), Managing the Commons (pp. 147-156). San Francisco: Freeman.
152. Van de Kragt, A., Orbell, J., Dawes, R. M. (1983). The minimal contribution set as a solution to public goods problems. American Political Science Review, 77, 112-122.
153. Van Lange, P. A. M. (1999). The pursuit of joint outcomes and equality in outcomes: An integrative model of social value orientation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77, 337-349.
154. Van Lange, P. A. M., Kuhlman, D. M. (1994). Social value orientations and impressions of partner's honesty and intelligence: A test of the might versus morality effect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 126-141.
155. Van Lange, P. A. M., Agnew, C. R., Harinck, F., Steemers, G. E. M. (1997a). From game theory to real life: How social value orientation affects willingness to sacrifice in ongoing close relationships. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 73, 1330-1344.
156. Van Lange, P. A. M., Otten, W., De Bruin, E. M. N., Joireman, J. A. (1997b). Development of prosocial, individualistic, and competitive orientations: Theory and preliminary evidence. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 73, 733-746.
157. Van Vugt, M., Van Lange, P. A. M., Meertens, R. M. (1996a). Commuting by car or public transportation? Social dilemma analysis of travel mode judgements. European Journal of Social Psychology, 26, 373-395.
158. Van Vugt, M., Van Lange, P. A. M., Meertens, R. M., Joireman, J. A. (1996b). How a structural solution to a real-world social dilemma failed: A field experiment on the first carpool lane in Europe. Social Psychology Quarterly, 59, 364-374.
159. Walker, J., Halloran, M. A. (2004). Rewards and sanctions and the provision of public goods in one-shot settings. Experimental Economics, 7, 235-247.
160. Weber, J. M., Kopelman, S., Messick, D. M. (2004). A conceptual review of decision making in social dilemmas: Applying a logic of appropriateness. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 8, 281-307.
161. Yamagishi, T., Sato, K. (1986). Motivational bases of the public goods problem. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 50, 67-73.
162. Yamagishi, T. (1986a). The provision of a sanctioning system as a public good. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51, 110-116.
163. Yamagishi, T. (1986b). The structural goal/expectation theory of cooperation in social dilemmas. Advances in Group Processes, 3, 51-87.
164. Yamagishi, T. (1988a). Seriousness of social dilemmas and the provision of a sanctioning system. Social Psychology Quarterly, 51, 32-42.
165. Yamagishi, T. (1988b). The provision of a sanctioning system in the United States and Japan. Social Psychology Quarterly, 51, 265-271.
166. Yamagishi, T. (1990a). Social Dilemmas. Tokyo: Science Press (in Japanese).
167. Yamagishi, T. (1990b). Factors mediating residual effects of group size in social dilemmas. The Japanese Journal of Psychology, 61, 162-169 (in Japanese).
168. Yamagishi, T. (1992). Group size and the provision of a sanctioning system in a social dilemma. In W. B. G. Liebrand, D. M. Messick & H. A. M. Wilke (eds.), Social Dilemma: Theoretical Issues and Research Findings (pp. 267-287). Oxford: Pergamon Press.
169. Yamagishi, T., Takahashi, N. (1994). Evolution of norms without metanorms. In U. Schulz, W. Albers & U. Mueller (eds.), Social Dilemmas and Cooperation (pp. 311-326). Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
170. Zahavi, A. (1977). The cost of honesty (Further remarks on the handicap principle). Journal of Theoretical Biology, 67, 603-605.