Why do people reject unintended inequity? Responders' rejection in a truncated ultimatum game

Psychological Reports

Volumn 96, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 533-541

  Ohmura, Y ^a   Yamagishi, Toshio ^a  

^a HOKKAIDO UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ADULT; ARTICLE; ATTITUDE; BEHAVIOR; DECISION MAKING; FEMALE; GAME; HUMAN; HUMAN RELATION; MALE; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR;

ADULT; CHOICE BEHAVIOR; FEMALE; GAME THEORY; HUMANS; INTENTION; INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS; MALE; REJECTION (PSYCHOLOGY); SOCIAL BEHAVIOR;

EID: 20744447526     PISSN: 00332941     EISSN: 1558691X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2466/PR0.96.2.533-541     Document Type: Article

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