Terrorism & game theory

Simulation and Gaming

Volumn 34, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 319-337

  Sandler, Todd ^a   Arce, Daniel G M ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b RHODES COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

Asymmetric information; Concessionary policy; Deterrence; Game theory; Preemption; Target choice; Terrorism; Transnational terrorism

Indexed keywords

EID: 46649106463     PISSN: 10468781     EISSN: 1552826X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1046878103255492     Document Type: Article

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