Terrorist signalling and the value of intelligence

British Journal of Political Science

Volumn 37, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 573-586

  Arce, Daniel G ^b   Sandler, Todd ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT DALLAS   (United States)

^b NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33947634937     PISSN: 00071234     EISSN: 14692112     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0007123407000324     Document Type: Review

References (47)

1. MSNBC.com, 'Group Threatens to Turn Spain into Inferno: Islamic Group Issues Warning after Alleged Plotters Kill Selves', 5 April 2004, accessed 3 June 2005.
2. Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, 'Conciliation, Counterterrorism, and Patterns of Terrorist Violence', International Organization, 59 (2005), 145-76;
3. Todd Sandler and Daniel Arce, 'Terrorism and Game Theory', Simulation and Gaming, 34 (2003), 319-37.
4. Frank L. Cilluffo, Ronald A. Marks and George C. Salmoiraghi, 'The Use and Limits of US Intelligence', Washington Quarterly, 25 (2002), 61-74.
5. Per Baltzer Overgaard, 'The Scale of Terrorist Attacks as a Signal of Resources', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 38 (1994), 452-78.
6. The literature on the value of intelligence for terrorism has focused on the prevention of specific events, such as 9/11 or terrorists' use of weapons of mass destruction - see, e.g., Kevin Michael Derksen, 'Commentary: The Logistics of Actionable Intelligence leading to 9/11 ', Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 28 (2005), 253-68;
7. Francis H. Marlo, 'WMD Terrorism and US Intelligence Collection', Terrorism and Political Violence, 11 (1999), 53-71.
8. In so doing, earlier articles indicated what type of intelligence (e.g., signal interception, human, or imagery) has the greatest effectiveness at each stage of a terrorist event. Unlike our exercise, the literature has not characterized the value of intelligence in terms of a signalling game of incomplete information, where the government is ill-informed about the nature of the terrorist group.
9. Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), pp. 185-205.
10. Bruce Hoffman and Gordon H. McCormick, 'Terrorism, Signaling, and Suicide Attacks', Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 27 (2004), 243-81.
11. Harvey E. Lapan and Todd Sandler, 'Terrorism and Signalling', European Journal of Political Economy, 9 (1993), 383-97.
12. Overgaard, 'The Scale of Terrorist Attacks as a Signal of Resources'.
13. Such periods have been identified by Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, 'Patterns of Transnational Terrorism, 1970-1999: Alternative Time-Series Estimates', International Studies Quarterly, 46 (2002), 145-65;
14. Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, "Transnational Terrorism 1968-2000: Thresholds, Persistence, and Forecasts', Southern Economic Journal, 71 (2005), 467-82.
15. Michael Doran, 'The Pragmatic Fanaticism of al Qaeda: An Anatomy of Extremism in Middle Eastern Politics', Political Science Quarterly, 117 (2002), 177-90.
16. Cilluffo, Marks and Salmoiraghi, 'The Use and Limits of US Intelligence', p. 65.
17. Sandler and Arce, 'Terrorism and Game Theory'.
18. Kevin Siqueira, 'Political and Militant Wings within Dissident Movements and Organizations', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49 (2005), 218-36.
19. Daniel G. Arce and Todd Sandler, 'Counterterrorism: A Game-Theoretic Analysis', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49 (2005), 183-200;
20. Todd Sandler and Kevin Siqueira, 'Global Terrorism: Deterrence versus Preemption', Canadian Journal of Economics, 39 (2006), 1370-87.
21. In Overgaard, 'The Scale of Terrorist Attacks as a Signal of Resources', the act of not conceding is described as a response, which we interpret as an increased defensive posture.
22. Lapan and Sandler, 'Terrorism and Signalling'. The Irangate hearing following the Reagan administration's arms-for-hostages negotiations was an effort by the US Congress to raise S to subsequent administrations.
23. This is akin to a sense of government resolve - see Robert Powell, 'The Dynamics of Longer Brinkmanship Crises', in Peter C. Ordeshook, ed., Models of Strategic Choice in Politics (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1989), pp. 151-75.
24. Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, 'Is Transnational Terrorism Becoming More Threatening? A Time-Series Investigation', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44 (2000), 307-32.
25. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, pp. 67-86.
26. Lufthansa flight 181, a Boeing 737, was hijacked en route from Mallorca to Frankfurt on 13 October 1977. The plane was stormed in Mogadishu, following stop-overs in Rome, Larnaca, Dubai and Aden.
27. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, p. 75.
28. Beliefs consistent with Condition 1 do not violate forward induction as M-types have the greater incentive to send an out-of-equilibrium signal of A.
29. See the discussion in Dwight R. Lee, 'Free Riding and Paid Riding in the Fight against Terrorism ', American Economic Association Papers and Proceedings, 78 (1988), 22-6.
30. For example, a revolutionary organization, known as the 17 November, had an alleged arrangement with the Greek government, whereby the terrorists directed attacks against non-Greek targets in return for sanctuary, see The Economist, issue no. 1831 (London: The Economist, 1984). From 1975 until the summer of 2002, the 17 November operated with impunity, carrying out 146 attacks and twenty-two assassinations. A failed bombing attempt on 22 June 2002 at the Port of Piraeus in Athens led to the first-ever arrest for the group.
31. Overgaard, 'The Scale of Terrorist Attacks as a Signal of Resources'.
32. Lapan and Sandler, 'Terrorism and Signalling'; Overgaard, 'The Scale of Terrorist Attacks as a Signal of Resources'. In the former study, ex post regret occurred when conceding to a low-resource type that initially attacks at a high (A) level.
33. As P-type have a payoff off the equilibrium path, R -A -vR, that is greater than its equilibrium payoff, these beliefs do not violate forward induction.
34. Arce and Sandler, 'Counterterrorism'.
35. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, p. 62.
36. The film is historically accurate since European civilians were only targeted after a bomb exploded in the predominately Arab Casbah district (presumably by rogue French officials) in response to FLN activities against French gendarmes.
37. 4 = 0, where no restriction on R results.
38. Peter Chalk, 'Liberation Tigers of Tamil: EELAM's (LTTE) International Organization - A Preliminary Analysis', Commentary No. 77, Canadian Intelligence Service, Ottawa, Canada, 2000.
39. Such insufficient measures are identified by Todd Sandler, 'Collective versus Unilateral Responses to Terrorism', Public Choice, 124 (2005), 75-93.
40. We thank an anonymous referee for this suggested extension.
41. See Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, p. 162.
42. Joao Ricardo Faria, 'Terror Cycles', Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics and Econometrics, 7 (2003), article 3.
43. Enders and Sandler, 'Patterns of Transnational Terrorism, 1970-1999'; Enders and Sandler, 'Transnational Terrorism 1968-2000'.
44. Hoffman and McCormick, 'Terrorism, Signaling, and Suicide Attacks', p. 244.
45. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism.
46. Sandler, 'Collective versus Unilateral Response to Terrorism'.
47. Arce and Sandler, 'Counterterrorism'.