Subsidies in interdependent security with heterogeneous discount rates

Engineering Economist

Volumn 52, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 1-19

  Zhuang, Jun ^a,c   Bier, Vicki M ^a   Gupta, Ashish ^b  

^a University of Wisconsin Madison   (United States)

^b Citi Sears   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGIES; HOMELAND SECURITY; MYOPIC AGENTS; SECURITY INVESTMENTS;

CASCADE CONNECTIONS; INVESTMENTS; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; NUMERICAL METHODS; OPTIMIZATION; RESOURCE ALLOCATION;

SECURITY SYSTEMS;

EID: 33847259790     PISSN: 0013791X     EISSN: 15472701     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00137910601159722     Document Type: Article

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