Dynamic mechanism design with hidden income and hidden actions

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 126, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 235-285

  Doepke, Matthias ^a,b   Townsend, Robert M ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b CEPR   (United Kingdom)

^c UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

Dynamic contracts; Mechanism design; Recursive contracts

Indexed keywords

EID: 30444461505     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2004.07.008     Document Type: Article

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