Swap bribery

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 5814 LNCS, Issue , 2009, Pages 299-310

  Elkind, Edith ^a,b   Faliszewski, Piotr ^c   Slinko, Arkadii ^d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON   (United Kingdom)

^b NANYANG TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY   (Singapore)

^c AGH UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY   (Poland)

^d UNIVERSITY OF AUCKLAND   (New Zealand)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPLEXITY RESULTS; MAXIMIN; PREFERENCE LISTS; VOTING RULES; VOTING THEORY;

COSTS;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 71549172526     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-04645-2_27     Document Type: Conference Paper

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