Political culture and discrimination in contests

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 95, Issue 1-2, 2011, Pages 88-93

  Epstein, Gil S ^a,b,c   Mealem, Yosef ^d   Nitzan, Shmuel ^a  

^a BAR ILAN UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

^b CReAM   (United Kingdom)

^c IZA   (Germany)

^d NETANYA ACADEMIC COLLEGE   (Israel)

Author keywords

All pay auction; Contests; Discrimination; Logit contest success function; Political culture

Indexed keywords

EID: 78650173020     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.09.012     Document Type: Article

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