Lottery versus all-pay auction models of lobbying

Public Choice

Volumn 112, Issue 3-4, 2002, Pages 351-371

  Fang, Hanming ^a  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036040402     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1019915126367     Document Type: Article

References (13)

1. Baye, M., Kovenock, D. and De Vries, C.G. (1993). Rigging the lobbying process: An application of the all-pay auction. American Economic Review 83: 289-294.
2. Baye, M., Kovenock, D. and De Vries, C.G. (1994). The solution to the Tullock rent-seeking game when R > 2: Mixed strategy equilibria and mean dissipation rates. Public Choice 81: 363-380.
3. Baye, M., Kovenock, D. and De Vries, C.G. (1996). The all-pay auction with complete information. Economic Theory 8: 291-305.
4. Che, Y.K. and Gale, I. (1997). Rent dissipation when rent seekers are budget constrained. Public Choice 92: 109-126.
5. Che, Y.K. and Gale, I. (1998). Caps on political lobbying. American Economic Review 88: 643-651.
6. Ellingsen, T. (1991). Strategic buyers and the social cost of monopoly. American Economic Review 81: 648-657.
7. Hardy, G.H., Littlewood, J.E. and Pólya, G. (1934). Inequalities. Cambridge University Press, Second Edition.
8. Hillman, A.L. and Riley, J.G. (1989). Politically contestable rents and transfers. Economics and Politics 1: 17-39.
9. Nti, K.O. (1999). Rent seeking with asymmetric valuations. Public Choice 98: 415-430.
10. Rowley, C.K. (1991). Gordon Tullock: Entrepreneur of public choice. Public Choice 71: 149-169.
11. Rowley, C.K. (1993). Public choice theory. Edward Elgar Publishing.
12. Tullock, G. (1975). On the efficient organization of trials. Kyklos 28: 745-762.
13. Tullock, G. (1980). Efficient rent seeking. In: J.M. Buchanan, R.D. Tollison and G. Tullock (Eds.), Toward a theory of the rent seeking society, 97-112. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.