Collective contests for commons and club goods

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 93, Issue 1-2, 2009, Pages 48-55

  Nitzan, Shmuel ^a   Ueda, Kaoru ^b  

^a BAR ILAN UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

^b NANZAN UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

Author keywords

Collective contest; Commons and club good prize; Excessive or inadequate winning group size; The group size paradox

Indexed keywords

EID: 57849155252     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.08.004     Document Type: Article

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