Optimal contest design, closeness and the contest success function

Public Choice

Volumn 129, Issue 1-2, 2006, Pages 217-231

  Runkel, Marco ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MUNICH   (Germany)

Author keywords

Closeness; Contest design; Contest success function

Indexed keywords

EID: 33749364911     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-006-9030-3     Document Type: Article

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