Contests with group-specific public-good prizes

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 30, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 103-117

  Baik, Kyung Hwan ^a  

^a Sungkyunkwan University   (South Korea)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 36448932768     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-007-0226-3     Document Type: Article

References (30)

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