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European Journal of Political Economy
Volumn 14, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 575-585
Optimal contest design: Volume and timing of rent seeking in contests
Author keywords

C72; Contest design; D72; Economic analysis of contests; Rent seeking
Indexed keywords

EID: 0039504564     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0176-2680(98)00026-3     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (34)
References (14)
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    • forthcoming
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    • Efficient rent seeking
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