Orchestrating rent seeking contests

Economic Journal

Volumn 109, Issue 458, 1999, Pages 536-545

  Gradstein, Mark ^a   Konrad, Kai A ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0012988470     PISSN: 00130133     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0297.00461     Document Type: Article

References (30)

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