Endogenous public policy, politicization and welfare

Journal of Public Economic Theory

Volumn 4, Issue 4, 2002, Pages 661-677

  Epstein, Gil S ^a,b,c   Nitzan, Shmuel ^a  

^a BAR ILAN UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

^b CEPR   (United Kingdom)

^c IZA   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0942295801     PISSN: 10973923     EISSN: 14679779     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1097-3923.00114     Document Type: Article

References (24)

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