Some results on rent-seeking contests with shortlisting

Public Choice

Volumn 105, Issue 3-4, 2000, Pages 245-253

  Amegashie, J Atsu ^a  

^a SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034368405     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1005130731201     Document Type: Article

References (12)

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3. Clark, D.J. and Riis, C. (1996). A multi-winner nested rent-seeking contest. Public Choice 87: 177-184.
4. Congleton, R.D. (1984). Committees and rent-seeking effort. Journal of Public Economics 25: 197-209.
5. Ellingsen, T. (1991). Strategic buyers and the social cost of monopoly. American Economic Review 81: 648-657.
6. Gradstein, M. and Konrad K.A. (1998). Orchestrating rent seeking contests. Unpublished manuscript.
7. Hillman, A.L. and Katz, E. (1984). Risk-averse rent seekers and the social cost of monopoly power. Economic Journal 94: 104-110.
8. Hillman, A.L. and Riley, J.G. (1989). Politically contestable rents and transfers. Economics and Politics Spring: 17-39.
9. Katz, E. and Tokatlidu, J. (1996). Group competition for rents. European Journal of Political Economy 12: 599-607.
10. Konrad, K.A, and Schlesinger, H. (1997). Risk aversion in rent-seeking and rent-augmenting games. Economic Journal 107: 1671-1683.
11. Nitzan, S. (1994). Modelling rent-seeking contests. European Journal of Political Economy 10: 41-60.
12. Tullock, G. (1980). Efficient rent seeking. In J.M. Buchanan, R.D. Tollison and G. Tullock (Eds.), Toward a theory of the rent-seeking society. Texas A&M University Press.