The politics of randomness

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 27, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 423-433

  Epstein, Gil S ^a,b   Nitzan, Shmuel ^a  

^a BAR ILAN UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

^b IZA   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33745324801     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-006-0125-z     Document Type: Article

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