Effort and performance in public policy contests

Journal of Public Economic Theory

Volumn 8, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 265-282

  Epstein, Gil S ^a,b,c   Nitzan, Shmuel ^a  

^a BAR ILAN UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

^b CEPR   (United Kingdom)

^c IZA   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34547281422     PISSN: 10973923     EISSN: 14679779     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2006.00263.x     Document Type: Article

References (26)

1. BAIK, K. H. (1994) Effort levels in contests with two asymmetric players, Southern Economic Journal 61, 367-378.
2. BAIK, K. H. (1999) Rent-seeking firms, consumer groups, and the social costs of monopoly, Economic Inquiry 37(3), 542-554.
3. BULOW, J., J. GEANAKOPLOS, and P. KLEMPRER (1985) Multi-market oligopoly: Strategic substitutes and complements, Journal of Political Economy 93, 488-511.
4. CUKIERMAN, A., and M. TOMMASI (1998) When does it take a Nixon to go to China, American Economic Review 88(1), 180-197.
5. DIXIT, A. (1987) Strategic behavior in contests, American Economic Review 77(5), 891-898.
6. ELLINGSEN, T. (1991) Strategic buyers and the social cost of monopoly, American Economic Review 81(3), 648-657.
7. EPSTEIN, G. S., and S. NITZAN (2002) Endogenous public policy, politicization and welfare, Journal of Public Economic Theory 4(4), 661-677.
8. EPSTEIN, G. S., and S. NITZAN (2003) Political culture and monopoly price determination, Social Choice and Welfare 21(1), 1-19.
9. EPSTEIN, G. S., and S. NITZAN (2004) Strategic restraint in contests, European Economic Review 48(1), 201-210.
10. EPSTEIN, G. S., and S. NITZAN (2006a), Lobbying and compromise, Public Choice (forthcoming).
11. EPSTEIN, G. S., and S. NITZAN (2006b) The politics of randomness, Social Choice and Welfare (forthcoming).
12. FABELLA, R.V. (1995) The social cost of rent seeking under countervailing opposition to distortionary transfers, Journal of Public Economics 57, 235-247.
13. GRADSTEIN, M. (1995) Intensity of competition, entry and entry deterrence in rentseeking contests, Economics and Politics 7, 79-91.
14. GROSSMAN, G., and E. HELPMAN (2001), Special Interest Politics. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press.
15. HILLMAN, A. L. (1989) The Political Economy of Protection. London: Harwood Academic Publishers.
16. HILLMAN, A. L., and J. G. RILEY (1989) Politically contestable rents and transfers, Economics and Politics 1, 17-39.
17. HURLEY, T. M., and J. F. SHOGREN (1998) Effort levels in Condorcet-Nash contests with asymmetric information, Journal of Public Economics 69, 195-210.
18. KONRAD, K. (2002) Investment in the absence of property rights; the role of incumbency advantages, European Economic Review 46(8), 1521-1537.
19. MUELLER, D. C. (2003) Public Choice III. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
20. NITZAN, S. (1994) Modelling rent-seeking contests, European Journal of Political Economy 10(1), 41-60.
21. NTI, K. O. (1997) Comparative statics of contests and rent-seeking games, International Economic Review 38(1), 43-59.
22. NTI, K. O. (1999) Rent seeking with asymmetric valuations, Public Choice 98(3-4), 415-430.
23. PERSSON, T., and G. TABELLINI (2000) Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press.
24. SKAPERDAS, S. (1992) Cooperation, conflict and power in the absence of property rights, American Economic Review 82(4), 721-739.
25. SKAPERDAS, S. (1996) Contest success functions, Economic Theory 7, 283-290.
26. TULLOCK, G. (1980) Efficient rent-seeking, in Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society, J. M. Buchanan, R. D. Tollison, and G. Tullock, eds. College Station, TX: Texas A. and M. University Press, 97-112.