Caps on Political Lobbying

American Economic Review

Volumn 88, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 643-651

  Che, Yeon Koo ^a,b   Gale, Ian L ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

^b YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000524929     PISSN: 00028282     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (19)

1. Alexander, Herbert E. and Bauer, Monica. Financing the 1988 election. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991.
2. Austen-Smith, David. "Campaign Contributions and Access." American Political Science Review, September 1995, 89(3), pp. 566-81.
3. Austen-Smith, David and Wright, John R. "Competitive Lobbying for a Legislator's Vote." Social Choice and Welfare, July 1992, 9(3), pp. 229-57.
4. Baye, Michael R.; Kovenock, Dan and de Vries, Casper G. "Rigging the Lobbying Process: An Application of All-Pay Auctions." American Economic Review, March 1993, 83(1), pp. 289-94.
5. _. "The All-Pay Auction with Complete Information." Economic Theory, August 1996, 8(2), pp. 291-305.
6. Congressional Quarterly. "House Votes to Toughen Gift Restrictions." November 18, 1995a, 53(45), pp. 3516-19.
7. _. "Bill Would Open Windows on Lobbying Efforts." December 2, 1995b, 53(47), pp. 3631-33.
8. _. "Hoekstra Proposes Legislation to Make Overhaul GOP Issue." February 3, 1996, 54(5), p. 281.
9. Fudenberg, Drew and Tirole, Jean. Game theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991.
10. Hall, Richard L. and Wayman, Frank W. "Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees." American Political Science Review, September 1990, 84(3), pp. 797-820.
11. Helsley, Robert W. and O'Sullivan, Arthur. "Altruistic Voting and Campaign Contributions." Journal of Public Economics, September 1994, 55(1), pp. 107-19.
12. Herndon, James F. "Access, Record, and Competition as Influences on Interest Group Contributions to Congressional Campaigns." Journal of Politics, November 1982, 44(4), pp. 996-1019.
13. Hillman, Arye L. and Riley, John G. "Politically Contestable Rents and Transfers." Economics and Politics, Spring 1989, 1(1), pp. 17-39.
14. Levitt, Steven D. "Congressional Campaign Finance Reform." Journal of Economic Perspectives, Winter 1995, 9(1), pp. 183-93.
15. Myerson, Roger B. "Optimal Auction Design." Mathematics of Operations Research, February 1981, 6(1), pp. 58-73.
16. Poole, Keith T.; Romer, Thomas and Rosenthal, Howard. "The Revealed Preferences of Political Action Committees." American Economic Review, May 1987 (Papers and Proceedings), 77(2), pp. 298-302.
17. Romer, Thomas and Snyder, James M., Jr. "An Empirical Investigation of the Dynamics of PAC Contributions." American Journal of Political Science, August 1994, 38(3), pp. 745-69.
18. Tullock, Gordon. "Efficient Rent Seeking," in James M. Buchanan, Robert D. Tollison, and Gordon Tullock, eds., Toward a theory of the rent seeking society. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1980, pp. 269-82.
19. Wright, John R. "Contributions, Lobbying and Committee Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives." American Political Science Review, June 1990, 84(2), pp. 417-38.