Rationalist approaches to conflict prevention and resolution

Annual Review of Political Science

Volumn 13, Issue , 2010, Pages 101-121

  Kydd, Andrew H ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

Author keywords

Bargaining; Conflict resolution; Intervention; Mediation; Monitoring

Indexed keywords

EID: 77952929605     PISSN: 10942939     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.032108.135916     Document Type: Article

References (110)

1. Axelrod R. 1984. The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books
2. Baliga S, Corchon LC, Sjostrom T. 1997. The theory of implementation when the planner is a player. J. Econ. Theory 77(1):15-33
3. Beardsley K. 2008. Agreement without peace? International mediation and time inconsistency problems. Am. J. Polit. Sci. 52(4):723-740
4. Bendor J, Kramer RM, Stout S. 1991. When in doubt. . . cooperation in a noisy Prisoner's Dilemma. J. Confl. Resolut. 35(4):691-719
5. Bendor J, Swistak P. 1997. The evolutionary stability of cooperation. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 91(2):290-307
6. Bercovitch J, Gartner SS, eds. 2009. International Conflict Mediation: New Approaches and Findings. Abingdon: Routledge
7. Bercovitch J, Houston A. 1993. Influence of mediator characteristics and behavior on the success of mediation in international relations. Int. J. Confl. Manag. 4(4):297-321
8. Bercovitch J, Houston A. 2000. Why do they do it like this? An analysis of the factors influencing mediation behavior in international conflicts. J. Confl. Resolut. 44(2):170-202
9. Bercovitch J, Langley J. 1993. The nature of the dispute and the effectiveness of international mediation. J. Confl. Resolut. 37(4):670-691
10. Bercovitch J, Schneider G. 2000.Whomediates? The political economy of international conflict management. J. Peace Res. 37(2):145-165
11. Blainey G. 1988. The Causes of War. New York: Free Press. 3rd ed.
12. Carment D, Rowlands D. 1998. Three's company: evaluating third-party intervention in intrastate conflict. J. Confl. Resolut. 42(5):572-599
13. Cetinyan R. 2002. Ethnic bargaining in the shadow of third-party intervention. Int. Organ. 56(3):645-677
14. Copeland DC. 2000. The Origins of Major War. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press
15. Crawford TW. 2003. Pivotal Deterrence: Third Party Statecraft and the Pursuit of Peace. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press
16. Crawford TW, Kuperman AJ, eds. 2006. Gambling on Humanitarian Intervention: Moral Hazard, Rebellion and Civil War. Abingdon, UK: Routledge
17. Crescenzi MJC, Kadera KM, Mitchell SM, Thyne CL. 2005. A Supply Side Theory of Mediation. Unpublished manuscript, Univ. North Carolina, Chapel Hill
18. Crocker CA, Hampson FO, Aall P, eds. 2005. Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict. Washington, DC: US Inst. Peace
19. Dixon WJ. 1996. Third-party techniques for preventing conflict escalation and promoting peaceful settlement. Int. Organ. 50(4):653-681
20. Downs GW, Rocke DM. 1994. Conflict, agency, and gambling for resurrection: the principal-agent problem goes to war. Am. J. Polit. Sci. 38(2):362-380
21. Doyle MW, Sambanis N. 2006. Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
22. Favretto K. 2009. Should peacemakers take sides? Major power mediation, coercion and bias. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 103(2):248-263
23. Fearon JD. 1993. Threats to use force: costly signals and bargaining in international crises. PhD thesis, Dep. Polit. Sci., Univ. Calif. Berkeley
24. Fearon JD. 1995. Rationalist explanations for war. Int. Organ. 49(3):379-414
25. Fearon JD. 1998. Bargaining, enforcement and international cooperation. Int. Organ. 52(2):269-305
26. Fearon JD. 2004. Separatist wars, partition and world order. Secur. Stud. 13(4):394-415
27. Fearon JD, Laitin DD. 2003. Ethnicity, insurgency and civil war. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 97(1):75-90
28. Fortna VP, Howard LM. 2008. Pitfalls and prospects in the peacekeeping literature. Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 11:283-301
29. Ghobarah H, Huth P, Russett B. 2003. Civil wars kill and maim people long after the shooting stops. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 97(2):189-202
30. Gilady L, Russett B. 2002. Peacemaking and conflict resolution. In Handbook of International Relations, ed.W Calsnaes, T Risse, B Simmons, pp. 392-408. London: Sage Publ.
31. Gilligan MJ, Sergenti EJ. 2008. Do UN interventions cause peace? Using matching to improve causal inference. Q. J. Polit. Sci. 3(2):89-122
32. Gleditsch KS, Beardsley K. 2004. Nosy neighbors: third party actors in Central American conflicts. J. Confl. Resolut. 48(3):379-401
33. Goddard SE. 2006. Uncommon ground: territorial conflict and the politics of legitimacy. Int. Organ. 60(1):35-68
34. Goemans HE. 2000. War and Punishment: the Causes of War Termination and the First World War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
35. Greig JM. 2001. Moments of opportunity. J. Confl. Resolut. 45(6):691-718
36. Grigoryan A. 2006. Third party intervention and escalation in Kosovo: Does moral hazard explain it? In Gambling on Humanitarian Intervention: Moral Hazard, Rebellion and Civil War, ed. TW Crawford, AJ Kuperman, pp. 45-64. Abingdon, UK: Routledge
37. Grigoryan A. 2009. Third Party Intervention and the Escalation of State-Minority Conflicts, pp. 45-64. Unpublished manuscript, Univ. Mich.
38. Harvey F. 1997. Deterrence and ethnic conflict: the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1993-94. Secur. Stud. 6(3):180-210
39. Hassner R. 2007. The path to intractability: time and the entrenchment of territorial disputes. Int. Secur. 31(3):107-138
40. Hirshleifer J. 1995. Anarchy and its breakdown. J. Polit. Econ. 103(1):26-52
41. Howard LM. 2007. UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
42. Huth PK. 1988. Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press
43. Huth PK. 1999. Deterrence and international conflict: empirical findings and theoretical debates. Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 2:25-48
44. Jarque X, Ponsati C, Sakovics J. 2003. Mediation: incomplete information bargaining with filtered communication. J. Math. Econ. 39(7):803-830
45. Jenne E. 2004. A bargaining theory of minority demands: explaining the dog that did not bite in 1990's Yugoslavia. Int. Stud. Q. 48(4):729-754
46. Jervis R. 1978. Cooperation under the security dilemma. World Polit. 30(2):167-214
47. Kaufmann C. 1996. Possible and impossible solutions to ethnic civil wars. Int. Secur. 20(4):136-175
48. Keohane RO. 1984. After Hegemony. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
49. Kleiboer M. 1996. Understanding success and failure of international mediation. J. Confl. Resolut. 40(2):360-389
50. Kuperman AJ. 2008a. Mitigating the moral hazard of humanitarian intervention: lessons from economics. Global Governance 14(2):219-240
51. Kuperman AJ. 2008b. The moral hazard of humanitarian intervention: lessons from the Balkans. Int. Stud. Q. 52(1):49-80
52. Kydd A. 2003. Which side are you on? Bias, credibility and mediation. Am. J. Polit. Sci. 47(4):597-611
53. Kydd AH. 2005. Trust and Mistrust in International Relations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
54. Kydd A. 2006. When can mediators build trust? Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 100(3):449-462
55. Leeds BA. 2003. Alliance reliability in times of war: explaining state decisions to violate treaties. Int. Organ. 57(4):801-827
56. Levy JS. 1988. Declining power and the preventive motivation for war. World Polit. 40(1):82-107
57. Licklider R, ed. 1993. Stopping the Killing: How Civil Wars End. New York: NY Univ. Press
58. Liebman A. 2009. The timing of power: threats, assurances and expanding interests. PhD thesis, Dep. Gov., Harvard Univ.
59. Lindley D. 2007. Promoting Peace with Information. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
60. Milgrom PR, North DC,Weingast BR. 1990. The role of institutions in the revival of trade: the medieval law merchant, private judges and Champaign fairs. Econ. Polit. 2:1-23
61. Mitusch K, Strausz R. 2005. Mediation in situations of conflict and limited commitment. J. Law Econ. Organ. 21(2):467-500
62. Morrow JD. 1994. Alliances, credibility, and peace time costs. J. Confl. Resolut. 38(2):270-297
63. Myerson RB. 1991. Analysis of incentives in bargaining and mediation. In Negotiation Analysis, ed. HP Young, pp. 67-85. Ann Arbor: Univ. Mich. Press
64. Niou EMS, Ordeshook PC, Rose GF. 1989. The Balance of Power: Stability in International Systems. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
65. O'Neill B. 2003. Mediating national honor: lessons from the era of duelling. J. Inst. Theor. Econ. 159(1):229-247
66. Oye KA, ed. 1986. Cooperation Under Anarchy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
67. Pillar PR. 1983. Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
68. Powell R. 1990. Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Problem of Credibility. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
69. Powell R. 1996. Stability and the distribution of power. World Polit. 48(1):239-267
70. Powell R. 1999. In the Shadow of Power. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
71. Powell R. 2002. Bargaining theory and international conflict. Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 5:1-30
72. Powell R. 2004a. Bargaining and learning while fighting. Am. J. Polit. Sci. 48(2):344-361
73. Powell R. 2004b. The inefficient use of power: costly conflict with complete information. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 98(2):231-241
74. Powell R. 2006.War as a commitment problem. Int. Organ. 60(1):169-203
75. Princen T. 1992. Intermediaries in International Conflict. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press
76. Rauchhaus RW. 2006a. Asymmetric information, mediation and conflict management.World Polit. 58(2):207-241
77. Rauchhaus RW. 2006b. Conflict management and the misapplication of moral hazard theory. In Gambling on Humanitarian Intervention: Moral Hazard, Rebellion and Civil War, ed. TW Crawford, AJ Kuperman, pp. 64-73. Abingdon, UK: Routledge
78. Rauchhaus RW. 2009. Principal-agent problems in humanitarian intervention: moral hazards, adverse selection and the commitment dilemma. Int. Stud. Q. 53(4):871-884
79. Regan PM. 2000. Civil Wars and Foreign Powers: Outside Intervention and Intrastate Conflict. Ann Arbor: Univ. Mich. Press
80. Regan PM. 2002. Third party interventions and the duration of intrastate conflicts. J. Confl. Resolut. 46(1):55-73
81. Regan PM, Stam AC. 2000. In the nick of time: conflict management, mediation timing, and the duration of interstate disputes. Int. Stud. Q. 44(2):239-260
82. Reiter D. 2003. Exploring the bargaining model of war. Perspect. Polit. 1(1):27-43
83. Rowlands D, Carment D. 1998. Moral hazard and conflict intervention. In The Political Economy of War and Peace, ed. MWolfson, pp. 267-285 Boston: Kluwer
84. Rowlands D, Carment D. 2006. Force and bias: towards a predictive model of effective third-party intervention. Defence Peace Econ. 17(5):435-456
85. Savun B. 2008. Information, bias, and mediation success. Int. Stud. Q. 52(1):25-47
86. Schrodt PA, Gerner DJ. 2004. An event data analysis of third-party mediation in the Middle East and Balkans. J. Confl. Resolut. 48(3):310-330
87. Signorino CS. 1996. Simulating international cooperation under uncertainty. J. Confl. Resolut. 40(1):152-205
88. Signorino CS, Tarar A. 2006. A unified theory and test of extended immediate deterrence. Am. J. Polit. Sci. 50(3):586-605
89. Slantchev BL. 2003. The principle of convergence in wartime negotiations. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 97(4):621-632
90. Slantchev B, Leventoglu B. 2007. The armed peace: a punctuated equilibrium theory of war. Am. J. Polit. Sci. 51(4):755-771
91. Smith A. 1995. Alliance formation and war. Int. Stud. Q. 39(4):405-426
92. Smith A, Stam A. 2003. Mediation and peacekeeping in a random walk model of civil and interstate war. Int. Stud. Rev. 5(4):115-135
93. Smith A, Stam AC. 2004. Bargaining and the nature of war. J. Confl. Resolut. 48(6):783-813
94. Snyder GH. 1971. "Prisoner's Dilemma" and "Chicken" models in international politics. Int. Stud. Q. 15(1):66-103
95. Snyder GH. 1984. The security dilemma in alliance politics. World Polit. 36(4):461-495
96. Snyder GH, Diesing P. 1977. Conflict among Nations: Bargaining, Decisionmaking and System Structure in International Crises. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
97. Stedman SJ, Rothchild D, Cousens EM, eds. 2002. Ending CivilWars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner
98. Svensson I. 2007. Bargaining, bias and peace brokers: how rebels commit to peace. J. Peace Res. 44(2):177-194
99. Terris LG, Maoz Z. 2005. Rational mediation: a theory and a test. J. Peace Res. 42(5):563-583
100. Toft M. 2005. The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests and the Indivisibility of Territory. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
101. Wagner RH. 1986. The theory of games and the balance of power. World Polit. 38(4):546-576
102. Wall JA. 1981. Mediation: an analysis, review and proposed research. J. Confl. Resolut. 25(1):157-183
103. Wall JA, Druckman D. 2003. Mediation in peacekeeping missions. J. Confl. Resolut. 47(5):693-705
104. Wall JA, Stark JB, Standifer RL. 2001. Mediation: a current review and theory development. J. Confl. Resolut. 45(3):370-391
105. Walter BF. 2002. Committing to Peace: the Successful Settlement of Civil Wars. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
106. Wilkenfeld J, Young KJ, Quinn DM, Asal V. 2005. Mediating International Crises. Abingdon, UK: Routledge
107. Wittman D. 1979. How a war ends: a rational model approach. J. Confl. Resolut. 23(4):743-763
108. Zagare FC. 1990. Rationality and deterrence. World Polit. 42(2):238-260
109. Zagare FC, Kilgour DM. 2000. Perfect Deterrence. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
110. Zartman WI. 1989. Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa. New York: Oxford Univ. Press