The theory of implementation when the planner is a player

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 77, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 15-33

  Baliga, Sandeep ^a   Corchon, Luis C ^b   Sjöström, Tomas ^c  

^a KING'S COLLEGE   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ALICANTE   (Spain)

^c HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031281197     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1997.2318     Document Type: Article

References (14)

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9. E. Maskin, 1977, Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality, MIT.
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