Deterrence and ethnic conflict: The case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1993-94

Security Studies

Volumn 6, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 180-210

  Harvey, Frank ^a  

^a DALHOUSIE UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001565821     PISSN: 09636412     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09636419708429318     Document Type: Article

References (101)

1. Paul Huth and Bruce M. Russett, "What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 1980," World Politics 36 (1984): 496-526; "Deterrence Failure and Crisis Escalation," International Studies Quarterly 32 (1988): 29-45; "Testing Deterrence Theory: Rigor Makes a Difference," World Politics 42 (1990): 466-501; Bruce Russett, "The Calculus of Deterrence," Journal of Conflict Resolution 7 (1963): 97-109; Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Beyond Deterrence," Journal of Social Issues 43 (1987): 5-71; "Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter," World Politics 41 (1989): 208-24; "When Does Deterrence Succeed and How Do We Know?" paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, (1989); and "Deterrence: The Elusive Dependent Variable." World Politics 42 (1990): 336-69.
2. Paul Huth and Bruce M. Russett, "What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 1980," World Politics 36 (1984): 496-526; "Deterrence Failure and Crisis Escalation," International Studies Quarterly 32 (1988): 29-45; "Testing Deterrence Theory: Rigor Makes a Difference," World Politics 42 (1990): 466-501; Bruce Russett, "The Calculus of Deterrence," Journal of Conflict Resolution 7 (1963): 97-109; Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Beyond Deterrence," Journal of Social Issues 43 (1987): 5-71; "Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter," World Politics 41 (1989): 208-24; "When Does Deterrence Succeed and How Do We Know?" paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, (1989); and "Deterrence: The Elusive Dependent Variable." World Politics 42 (1990): 336-69.
3. Paul Huth and Bruce M. Russett, "What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 1980," World Politics 36 (1984): 496-526; "Deterrence Failure and Crisis Escalation," International Studies Quarterly 32 (1988): 29-45; "Testing Deterrence Theory: Rigor Makes a Difference," World Politics 42 (1990): 466-501; Bruce Russett, "The Calculus of Deterrence," Journal of Conflict Resolution 7 (1963): 97-109; Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Beyond Deterrence," Journal of Social Issues 43 (1987): 5-71; "Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter," World Politics 41 (1989): 208-24; "When Does Deterrence Succeed and How Do We Know?" paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, (1989); and "Deterrence: The Elusive Dependent Variable." World Politics 42 (1990): 336-69.
4. Paul Huth and Bruce M. Russett, "What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 1980," World Politics 36 (1984): 496-526; "Deterrence Failure and Crisis Escalation," International Studies Quarterly 32 (1988): 29-45; "Testing Deterrence Theory: Rigor Makes a Difference," World Politics 42 (1990): 466-501; Bruce Russett, "The Calculus of Deterrence," Journal of Conflict Resolution 7 (1963): 97-109; Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Beyond Deterrence," Journal of Social Issues 43 (1987): 5-71; "Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter," World Politics 41 (1989): 208-24; "When Does Deterrence Succeed and How Do We Know?" paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, (1989); and "Deterrence: The Elusive Dependent Variable." World Politics 42 (1990): 336-69.
5. Paul Huth and Bruce M. Russett, "What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 1980," World Politics 36 (1984): 496-526; "Deterrence Failure and Crisis Escalation," International Studies Quarterly 32 (1988): 29-45; "Testing Deterrence Theory: Rigor Makes a Difference," World Politics 42 (1990): 466-501; Bruce Russett, "The Calculus of Deterrence," Journal of Conflict Resolution 7 (1963): 97-109; Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Beyond Deterrence," Journal of Social Issues 43 (1987): 5-71; "Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter," World Politics 41 (1989): 208-24; "When Does Deterrence Succeed and How Do We Know?" paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, (1989); and "Deterrence: The Elusive Dependent Variable." World Politics 42 (1990): 336-69.
6. Paul Huth and Bruce M. Russett, "What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 1980," World Politics 36 (1984): 496-526; "Deterrence Failure and Crisis Escalation," International Studies Quarterly 32 (1988): 29-45; "Testing Deterrence Theory: Rigor Makes a Difference," World Politics 42 (1990): 466-501; Bruce Russett, "The Calculus of Deterrence," Journal of Conflict Resolution 7 (1963): 97-109; Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Beyond Deterrence," Journal of Social Issues 43 (1987): 5-71; "Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter," World Politics 41 (1989): 208-24; "When Does Deterrence Succeed and How Do We Know?" paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, (1989); and "Deterrence: The Elusive Dependent Variable." World Politics 42 (1990): 336-69.
7. Paul Huth and Bruce M. Russett, "What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 1980," World Politics 36 (1984): 496-526; "Deterrence Failure and Crisis Escalation," International Studies Quarterly 32 (1988): 29-45; "Testing Deterrence Theory: Rigor Makes a Difference," World Politics 42 (1990): 466-501; Bruce Russett, "The Calculus of Deterrence," Journal of Conflict Resolution 7 (1963): 97-109; Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Beyond Deterrence," Journal of Social Issues 43 (1987): 5-71; "Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter," World Politics 41 (1989): 208-24; "When Does Deterrence Succeed and How Do We Know?" paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, (1989); and "Deterrence: The Elusive Dependent Variable." World Politics 42 (1990): 336-69.
8. Paul Huth and Bruce M. Russett, "What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 1980," World Politics 36 (1984): 496-526; "Deterrence Failure and Crisis Escalation," International Studies Quarterly 32 (1988): 29-45; "Testing Deterrence Theory: Rigor Makes a Difference," World Politics 42 (1990): 466-501; Bruce Russett, "The Calculus of Deterrence," Journal of Conflict Resolution 7 (1963): 97-109; Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Beyond Deterrence," Journal of Social Issues 43 (1987): 5-71; "Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter," World Politics 41 (1989): 208-24; "When Does Deterrence Succeed and How Do We Know?" paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, (1989); and "Deterrence: The Elusive Dependent Variable." World Politics 42 (1990): 336-69.
9. Frank Harvey, "Rational Deterrence Theory Revisited: A Progress Report," Canadian Journal of Political Science 28 (September 1995): 403-36; Frank Harvey and Patrick James, "Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Record of Aggregate Testing and an Alternative Research Agenda," Conflict Management and Peace Science 12 (1992): 17-45; "Nuclear Powers at the Brink: Toward a Multi-Stage Game of Crisis Interaction," International Political Science Review 17, no. 2 (1996).
10. Frank Harvey, "Rational Deterrence Theory Revisited: A Progress Report," Canadian Journal of Political Science 28 (September 1995): 403-36; Frank Harvey and Patrick James, "Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Record of Aggregate Testing and an Alternative Research Agenda," Conflict Management and Peace Science 12 (1992): 17-45; "Nuclear Powers at the Brink: Toward a Multi-Stage Game of Crisis Interaction," International Political Science Review 17, no. 2 (1996).
11. Frank Harvey, "Rational Deterrence Theory Revisited: A Progress Report," Canadian Journal of Political Science 28 (September 1995): 403-36; Frank Harvey and Patrick James, "Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Record of Aggregate Testing and an Alternative Research Agenda," Conflict Management and Peace Science 12 (1992): 17-45; "Nuclear Powers at the Brink: Toward a Multi-Stage Game of Crisis Interaction," International Political Science Review 17, no. 2 (1996).
12. NATO air strikes, for example, were used to deter the Bosnian Serb military from attacking peacekeepers and shelling UN declared safe havens. Later in the crisis the Bosnian Serb military used UN peacekeepers as hostages (or human shields) to deter further NATO air strikes.
13. Carefully separating threat-counter-threat sequences to allow researchers to pinpoint aspects of behavior conforming to a direct or extended, immediate deterrence or compellence encounter is difficult, if not impossible, to accomplish with any degree of empirical precision. Crises frequently encompass several different types of interaction.
14. A sample of cases must be alike in theoretical terms in order to be comparable. As Huth and Russett point out, "the fundamental differences in the policy instruments used by state A to deter, and the types of policy actions being considered by state B, suggest that theoretical propositions on success or failure in one class of cases cannot readily be applied to other cases....State B may be vulnerable to military retaliation by state A but may not be vulnerable economically." Huth and Russett, "Testing Deterrence Theory," 473. Gordon Craig and Alexander George provide a practical example of this complexity in their study of the 1973 Yom Kippur war in Farte and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).
15. A sample of cases must be alike in theoretical terms in order to be comparable. As Huth and Russett point out, "the fundamental differences in the policy instruments used by state A to deter, and the types of policy actions being considered by state B, suggest that theoretical propositions on success or failure in one class of cases cannot readily be applied to other cases....State B may be vulnerable to military retaliation by state A but may not be vulnerable economically." Huth and Russett, "Testing Deterrence Theory," 473. Gordon Craig and Alexander George provide a practical example of this complexity in their study of the 1973 Yom Kippur war in Farte and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).
16. For an excellent discussion of these and other problems with aggregate tests of deterrence theory, see Jack Levy, "When Do Deterrent Threats Work," British Journal of Political Science 18 (1988): 485-512; Robert Jervis, "Deterrence Theory Revisited," World Politics 31 (1979): 289-324; and Patrick Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977). The controversy surrounding judgments about success and failure has received detailed treatment elsewhere (refer to references in note 1). See also the special issue of the Journal of Social Issues 43 (1987). The most apparent problem is the tendency to select cases that disprove the theory. Selection bias occurs because it is easier to identify deterrence failures, given the nature of the evidence required to establish that threats succeeded - challengers may never have intended on challenging in the first place, so the failure to mount a challenge cannot count as an instance of successful deterrence. On the issue of selection bias, see Christopher Achen and Duncan Snidal, "Rational Deterrence Theory and the Comparative Case Studies," World Politics 41, no. 2 (January 1989): 143-69.
17. For an excellent discussion of these and other problems with aggregate tests of deterrence theory, see Jack Levy, "When Do Deterrent Threats Work," British Journal of Political Science 18 (1988): 485-512; Robert Jervis, "Deterrence Theory Revisited," World Politics 31 (1979): 289-324; and Patrick Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977). The controversy surrounding judgments about success and failure has received detailed treatment elsewhere (refer to references in note 1). See also the special issue of the Journal of Social Issues 43 (1987). The most apparent problem is the tendency to select cases that disprove the theory. Selection bias occurs because it is easier to identify deterrence failures, given the nature of the evidence required to establish that threats succeeded - challengers may never have intended on challenging in the first place, so the failure to mount a challenge cannot count as an instance of successful deterrence. On the issue of selection bias, see Christopher Achen and Duncan Snidal, "Rational Deterrence Theory and the Comparative Case Studies," World Politics 41, no. 2 (January 1989): 143-69.
18. For an excellent discussion of these and other problems with aggregate tests of deterrence theory, see Jack Levy, "When Do Deterrent Threats Work," British Journal of Political Science 18 (1988): 485-512; Robert Jervis, "Deterrence Theory Revisited," World Politics 31 (1979): 289-324; and Patrick Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977). The controversy surrounding judgments about success and failure has received detailed treatment elsewhere (refer to references in note 1). See also the special issue of the Journal of Social Issues 43 (1987). The most apparent problem is the tendency to select cases that disprove the theory. Selection bias occurs because it is easier to identify deterrence failures, given the nature of the evidence required to establish that threats succeeded - challengers may never have intended on challenging in the first place, so the failure to mount a challenge cannot count as an instance of successful deterrence. On the issue of selection bias, see Christopher Achen and Duncan Snidal, "Rational Deterrence Theory and the Comparative Case Studies," World Politics 41, no. 2 (January 1989): 143-69.
19. For an excellent discussion of these and other problems with aggregate tests of deterrence theory, see Jack Levy, "When Do Deterrent Threats Work," British Journal of Political Science 18 (1988): 485-512; Robert Jervis, "Deterrence Theory Revisited," World Politics 31 (1979): 289-324; and Patrick Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977). The controversy surrounding judgments about success and failure has received detailed treatment elsewhere (refer to references in note 1). See also the special issue of the Journal of Social Issues 43 (1987). The most apparent problem is the tendency to select cases that disprove the theory. Selection bias occurs because it is easier to identify deterrence failures, given the nature of the evidence required to establish that threats succeeded - challengers may never have intended on challenging in the first place, so the failure to mount a challenge cannot count as an instance of successful deterrence. On the issue of selection bias, see Christopher Achen and Duncan Snidal, "Rational Deterrence Theory and the Comparative Case Studies," World Politics 41, no. 2 (January 1989): 143-69.
20. For an excellent discussion of these and other problems with aggregate tests of deterrence theory, see Jack Levy, "When Do Deterrent Threats Work," British Journal of Political Science 18 (1988): 485-512; Robert Jervis, "Deterrence Theory Revisited," World Politics 31 (1979): 289-324; and Patrick Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977). The controversy surrounding judgments about success and failure has received detailed treatment elsewhere (refer to references in note 1). See also the special issue of the Journal of Social Issues 43 (1987). The most apparent problem is the tendency to select cases that disprove the theory. Selection bias occurs because it is easier to identify deterrence failures, given the nature of the evidence required to establish that threats succeeded - challengers may never have intended on challenging in the first place, so the failure to mount a challenge cannot count as an instance of successful deterrence. On the issue of selection bias, see Christopher Achen and Duncan Snidal, "Rational Deterrence Theory and the Comparative Case Studies," World Politics 41, no. 2 (January 1989): 143-69.
21. Each research enterprise - aggregate data analysis, as applied by Huth and Russett, or structured, focused comparison, as used by Lebow and Stein - manifests the problems that will face any framework that focuses on success versus failure. For a discussion of research enterprises, see Patrick James, "Structural Realism as a Research Enterprise: Toward Elaborated Structural Realism," International Political Science Renew 14 (1993): 123-48. For details on structured focused comparison, see Alexander George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy.
22. Each research enterprise - aggregate data analysis, as applied by Huth and Russett, or structured, focused comparison, as used by Lebow and Stein - manifests the problems that will face any framework that focuses on success versus failure. For a discussion of research enterprises, see Patrick James, "Structural Realism as a Research Enterprise: Toward Elaborated Structural Realism," International Political Science Renew 14 (1993): 123-48. For details on structured focused comparison, see Alexander George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy.
23. Lebow and Stein, "Beyond Deterrence," 28-29.
24. Huth and Russett, "Testing Deterrence Theory"; Lebow and Stein, "I Think Therefore I Deter"; and James Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model," Journal of Conflict Resolution 38, no. 2 (June 1994): 236-69.
25. Huth and Russett, "Testing Deterrence Theory"; Lebow and Stein, "I Think Therefore I Deter"; and James Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model," Journal of Conflict Resolution 38, no. 2 (June 1994): 236-69.
26. Huth and Russett, "Testing Deterrence Theory"; Lebow and Stein, "I Think Therefore I Deter"; and James Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model," Journal of Conflict Resolution 38, no. 2 (June 1994): 236-69.
27. Elli Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work?: Lessons from the Egyptian-Israeli Enduring Rivalry," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995); Gary Geortz, "(Enduring) Rivalries and the Study of Deterrence," paper presented at a conference on "Deterrence in Enduring Rivalries," Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. (September 1995).
28. Elli Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work?: Lessons from the Egyptian-Israeli Enduring Rivalry," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995); Gary Geortz, "(Enduring) Rivalries and the Study of Deterrence," paper presented at a conference on "Deterrence in Enduring Rivalries," Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. (September 1995).
29. Geortz, "(Enduring) Rivalries and the Study of Deterrence."
30. Huth and Russett, "Testing Deterrence Theory," 475.
31. Although this distinction is useful, there are exceptions that should be noted. If state A threatens retaliation to contain the spread of violence in a crisis, does this constitute an attempt to deter escalation or compel compliance with demands to keep the fighting to a minimum? Similarly, does one deter a state from rejecting the latest peace proposal, or compel leaders to accept it? Did the U.S. threaten Serbia with economic sanctions in order to compel its leader (Milosevic) to endorse the Vance-Owen plan, deter undesired actions in the form of Serbia's rejection of the accord, or compel Milosevic to deter Karadzic from escalating Bosnian-Serb attacks on Muslim enclaves? These questions are especially relevant in the case of the former Yugoslavia because the coercive threats attempted to accomplish more than one objective: deter escalation, particularly with respect to ethnic cleansing, through the creation of "safe havens" and "no-fly zones"; and compel the Bosnian Serbs to accept Vance-Owen or, at least, return to the bargaining table. Even a straightforward threat linked to protection of safe havens is problematic - were the Americans and Europeans (through NATO) trying to compel the Serbs to back away from territory bordering these "safe" areas, deter them from crossing the exclusion zone or shelling the city, or both? The issue becomes even more confusing when one considers encounters that constitute examples of successful deterrence but failed compellence, and vice versa. A major advantage of looking at crisis in terms of separate and distinct exchanges is that it offers an opportunity to look for both types of interaction in the same case, thus avoiding the need to make judgments about motives and intentions across the entire crisis.
32. The approach may bias case selection toward identifying failures, but if behavior in a crisis is consistent with expectations, notwithstanding this selection bias, all the more reason to accept the theory.
33. The crucial question is whether the retaliatory threat is more costly to the challenger than the sacrifice incurred through capitulation, or whether the sacrifice is significant to the challenger's overall objectives? The no-fly zone succeeded, for example, but the Bosnian Serbs simply switched to a ground attack and began operating in Serbian air space. Since the objective was to deter the use of air space over Bosnia, the threat worked. The no-fly zone resolution was never expected to end the war or create peace in the region.
34. Lebow and Stein, "Rational Deterrence Theory," 208-24.
35. A few notes about "commitment" are in order. Rational deterrence theory stipulates that the challenger will assess the costs and benefits of inaction vs. action depending on, among other things, a critical judgment by the challenger of the defender's commitment to its threat. Cases, however, cannot be selected on the basis of whether there was a serious commitment by the defender to retaliate, because this would naturally bias the results in favor of successful deterrence. See Fearon, "Signaling Versus the Balance of Power" for an excellent discussion on this point. When assessing the defender's commitment to respond, a challenger will consider the severity of its challenge in terms of the defender's political and security interests. Consequently, challenges are often tailored in such a way that retaliation is deemed by the defender to be unnecessary, as demonstrated by the use of limited probes by the Bosnian Serbs to test the resolve of NATO. Refer to George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign PoEy for examples of limited probes in deterrence failures.
36. This time frame involved the most diplomatic and military interaction between the two sides since the onset of hostilities, and provides a large body of evidence with which to evaluate the theories.
37. Four main sources of data were used: 1) interviews with personnel in defense policy and planning divisions within NATO; 2) unclassified UN and NATO documents; 3) Keesing's Contemporary Archiver, and 4) The New York Times and New York Times Index. Detailed coverage of the crisis in the New York Times and Keesing's provides an excellent chronology of events and interactions for the period in question. This data also facilitates assessment of the nature, sequence, and timing of provocations and threats of retaliation throughout the year. New York Times and Keesing's ensured that both American and European perspectives were considered when recording interactions and events. Major inconsistencies in reports were noted. In general, Keesing's was more vague on details, even whole exchanges (for example, Exchange 3) were excluded from coverage. Several additional American and European sources were used to confirm New York Times and Keesing's coverage - U.S. News and World Report, the Economist, the Herald Tribune (London) and the Times (London). Coverage in these journals tended to be less specific and more policy oriented, focusing on the technicalities of the latest peace accord while providing fewer details on interactions.
38. In order to deal with the problem of biased reporting, and the possibility that some judgments about the clarity, credibility, and capability of U.S.-NATO threats are entirely impressionistic, the two NATO officials and Major-General J. A. MacInnis (UNPROFOR) had an opportunity to review the evidence and offer their interpretation of perceptions, intentions, and motives in each exchange. Two senior policy analysts within NATO were also consulted - Edgard Vandeputte of the Defense Planning and Policy Division/Crisis Management Section, and Richard Zandee of the Disarmament, Arms Control and Cooperative Security Section/Political Affairs Division. Each was asked to review the eight exchanges and to comment on both the accuracy of the historical account and the author's interpretation of perceptions and motives. Their recommendations and suggestions have been incorporated in the final presentation of the encounters. Major-General J. A. MacInnis was asked to review the exchanges as well. For many, the general was either directly involved, or reviewed documentation and strategies with those who were. From his office in Zagreb he had direct contact with NATO officials in Brussels and Naples as well as with UN officials in Zagreb and New York. In many instances he served as one of the bridges between the two organizations. As a Canadian, he had access into both camps, unlike Yasushi Akashi, the special representative of Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who was unfamiliar with the civilian structure of NATO, or the force commanders (Cot and deLepresle) who were not familiar with the workings of the integrated military structures.
39. For current research on how post-1945 civil wars end, see Roy Licklider, ed., Stopping the Killing (New York: New York University Press, 1993); "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993," American Political Science Review 89, no. 3 (1995): 681-90; and William Zartman, Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars, 1995-1996, (Washington, D.C: Brookings, 1995).
40. For current research on how post-1945 civil wars end, see Roy Licklider, ed., Stopping the Killing (New York: New York University Press, 1993); "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993," American Political Science Review 89, no. 3 (1995): 681-90; and William Zartman, Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars, 1995-1996, (Washington, D.C: Brookings, 1995).
41. For current research on how post-1945 civil wars end, see Roy Licklider, ed., Stopping the Killing (New York: New York University Press, 1993); "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993," American Political Science Review 89, no. 3 (1995): 681-90; and William Zartman, Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars, 1995-1996, (Washington, D.C: Brookings, 1995).
42. Some of the exchanges involved the UN as defender, not NATO: Exchange II in which the threat was a UN ultimatum to Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs to accept the Vance-Owen peace plan or face a tough economic embargo, and Exchanges I and V involving UN resolutions authorizing NATO air strikes if certain demands were not met.
43. Dick Zandee, Disarmament, Arms Control and Cooperative Security Section: Political Affairs Division, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Brussels - personal correspondence (1995).
44. Alan Cowell, "NATO Jets to Enforce Ban on Illegal Bosnia Flights," New York Times, 12 April 1993, A8.
45. Paul Lewis, "Top Bosnian Serb Facing U.S. Action, Signs a Peace Plan," New York Times, 3 May 1993, A1, A10.
46. Keesing's Contemporary Archives reported on 4 December 1993 that 56 civilians were killed in a single shelling in Srebrenica, 39426-27.
47. New York Times, 18 April 1993, A16.
48. This prompted speculation that U.S. officials were worried about the precedent a stronger statement would set for Israeli compliance with similar UN resolutions.
49. John Darnton, "Leader of Bosnian Serbs Remains Firmly Against Peace Plan, Despite UN Pressure," New York Times, 19 April 1993, A14.
50. Previously, on 2 April 1993, the Bosnian Serb Assembly rejected a UN resolution allowing for conditional acceptance of the Vance-Owen plan, with hard-line members dismissing as unacceptable the proposed allocation of only 43 percent of territory to Serbs, compared with 70 percent currently occupied (Keesing's, 4 April 1994, 39425-26). Many analysts interpreted the Bosnian Serb decision as a calculated gamble that the West would remain tentative in their response and that there would be no direct international military intervention.
51. Stephen Kinzer, "Serbs Attack Muslim Stronghold in Northwest Bosnia," New York Times, 28 April 1993, A11.
52. Elaine Sciolino, "Bosnia Rivals Set New Talks As U.S. Weighs Action Plans," New York Times, 30 April 1993, A1, A7.
53. As Karadzic prepared for a new round of negotiations, the military continued to shell Sarajevo, Srebrenica and Bihac. Michael Gordon, "Clinton Says U.S. Pressure Nudged Serbs back to Talks," New York Times, 1 May 1993, A6.
54. George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy.
55. Thomas L. Friedman, "Bosnia air strikes backed by Clinton, his officials say," New York Times, 2 May 1993, A1, A12.
56. Paul Lewis, "Top Bosnian Serb Facing U.S. Action, Signs a Peace Plan," New York Times, 3 May 1993, A1, A10.
57. Stephen Kinzer, "Serbs Reject Bosnia Pact, Defying Friends and Foes and Insist on Referendum," New York Times, 6 May 1993, A1, A16.
58. Frank J. Prial, "Resolution Establishes Safe Areas But Lacks Enforcement Provision," New York Times, 7 May 1993, A11.
59. "The White House was not in the grip of war planning and there [were] no special deployments of American aircraft or military personnel in preparation for action in Bosnia," Thomas L. Friedman, New York Times, 9 May 1993, A1.
60. New York Times, 8 May 1993, A4.
61. Major-General J. A. MacInnis, Land Force Atlantic Area Headquarters, Halifax - personal correspondence (1995).
62. For details, see the Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolutions 982 (1995) and 987 (1995), United Nations, 5 May 1995.
63. Keesing's, July 1994, 39563-64.
64. United Nations Human Rights Commission, statement, Geneva, 8 July 1993.
65. Steven A. Holmes, "U.S. May Attack Serbs Even Without NATO," New York Times, 2 August 1993, A3.
66. Craig R. Whitney, "NATO to join U.S. in Planning Air Strikes Against Serbs' Forces," New York Times, 3 August 1993, A1.
67. Douglas Jehl, "U.S. Turns Bosnia Threat Into Near Ultimatum," New York Times, 4 August 1993, A1.
68. John F. Burns, "Dawn Brings a Ray of Hope to a Newly Silent Sarajevo," New York Times, 4 August 1993, A8.
69. Douglas Jehl, "Serbs Must Withdraw Promptly or Face Air Strikes, U.S. Insists," New York Times, 12 August 1993, A1.
70. David Binder, "U.S. Renews Warning to Serbs on Sarajevo Shelling, New York Times, 19 October 1993, A8.
71. According to Keesing's, 18 October 1994, 39695, Clinton publicly criticized his European allies for inaction.
72. R. W. Apple, "NATO Again Plans Possible Air Raids on Serbs in Bosnia," New York Times, 12 January 1994, A1.
73. Keesing's, 7 February 1994. 39870.
74. Ibid.
75. John Kifner, "Serbs agree to Give up Sarajevo Guns," New York Times, 10 February 1994, A14.
76. The large-scale withdrawal of Serb equipment, described by Lieutenant-General Rose as "an exodus," began on 17 February, after the controversial intervention by Yeltsin to send Russian troops to the region. His objective was to fill the vacuum left by Bosnian Serbs in the exclusion zone. Keesing's, 10-17 February 1994, 39871.
77. John Kifner, "UN reports Serbs are pulling back around Sarajevo," New York Times, 18 February 1994, A1.
78. Stephen Cohen, New York Times, February 1994, A1.
79. Bosnian Serb troops began bombarding the enclave in late March, stepping up the assault on 4 April, and breaching the Bosnian government front lines on 5 April when several villages were seized. Fighting resumed on 8 April after a twenty-four-hour cease-fire. On 10 April there was another Serb offensive involving tanks, infantry and artillery bombardment on Gorazde. Keesing's, 4-8 April 1995, 39966.
80. Keesing's, 3 April 1995, 39966.
81. Paul Lewis, "UN Warns Serbs on Gorazde; Move could Lead to Air Strikes," New York Times, 10 April 1994, A1.
82. Chuck Sudetic, "2 NATO Jets Bomb the Serbs Besieging a Bosnian Haven; U.S. Warns of More Strikes," New York Times, 11 April 1994, A1, A6.
83. Chuck Sudetic, "U.S. Planes Bomb Serbian Positions for a Second Day: Serbs Voicing Defiance," New York Times, 12 April 1994, A1, A10.
84. Michael R. Gordon, "The Bluff That Failed," New York Times, 19 April 1994, A1.
85. Keesing's, 25 April 1995, 39967.
86. Douglas Dion, "Evidence and inference in the comparative case study" (University of Michigan, unpub. ms., 1994); Gary Geortz and Bear F. Braumoelle, "The Necessary and Sufficient Condition Hypothesis" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Assciation, 1996); Frank Harvey, "Deterrence and Compellence in Protracted Crisis: A New Approach to Data and Testing," International Studies Notes (forthcoming, 1997).
87. Douglas Dion, "Evidence and inference in the comparative case study" (University of Michigan, unpub. ms., 1994); Gary Geortz and Bear F. Braumoelle, "The Necessary and Sufficient Condition Hypothesis" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Assciation, 1996); Frank Harvey, "Deterrence and Compellence in Protracted Crisis: A New Approach to Data and Testing," International Studies Notes (forthcoming, 1997).
88. Douglas Dion, "Evidence and inference in the comparative case study" (University of Michigan, unpub. ms., 1994); Gary Geortz and Bear F. Braumoelle, "The Necessary and Sufficient Condition Hypothesis" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Assciation, 1996); Frank Harvey, "Deterrence and Compellence in Protracted Crisis: A New Approach to Data and Testing," International Studies Notes (forthcoming, 1997).
89. Deterrence may fail even if differences in relative capabilities are significant. If challengers are motivated by the fact that their capabilities have peaked (or are likely to diminish) relative to the defender, they still may choose to challenge; it may be the best shot they have.
90. Alexander George, Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War (U.S. Institute for Peace, Washington, D.C, 1991).
91. It is not my intention to debate the merits of intervention. The focus here is on how to intervene successfully once it has been deemed by the international community to be ac-ceptable and necessary. The recommendations will not cover the subject of peacekeeping operations, or how UNPROFOR (and similar force deployments) can be more successful at achieving humanitarian objectives.
92. Thomas G. Weiss, "Intervention: Whither the United Nations," Washington Quarterly 17 (1994): 109-28. Lincoln P. Bloomfield, "The Premature Burial of Global Law and Orden Looking Beyond the Three Cases From Hell," Washington Quarterly 17 (1994): 157, makes a similar argument: "If the European powers (and the United States) had moved early to confront the latter-day vandals off Dubrovnik, or to actively protect relief supplies and UN peacekeepers at Sarajevo airport when first fired upon, or had consistently punished violations of their no-fly zones, things might have turned out differently."
93. Thomas G. Weiss, "Intervention: Whither the United Nations," Washington Quarterly 17 (1994): 109-28. Lincoln P. Bloomfield, "The Premature Burial of Global Law and Orden Looking Beyond the Three Cases From Hell," Washington Quarterly 17 (1994): 157, makes a similar argument: "If the European powers (and the United States) had moved early to confront the latter-day vandals off Dubrovnik, or to actively protect relief supplies and UN peacekeepers at Sarajevo airport when first fired upon, or had consistently punished violations of their no-fly zones, things might have turned out differently."
94. Charles T. Alan, "Extended Conventional Deterrence: In from the Cold and Out of the Nuclear Freeze," Washington Quarterly 17 (1994): 203-33. See also Alexander George, Forceful Persuasion; Jeffrey Record, "Defeating Desert Storm (and Why Saddam Didn't)," Comparative Strategy 12 (1993): 125-40; and Adam Garfinkle, "The Gulf Wan Was It Worth It?" World & I 6 (1991): 70-79.
95. Charles T. Alan, "Extended Conventional Deterrence: In from the Cold and Out of the Nuclear Freeze," Washington Quarterly 17 (1994): 203-33. See also Alexander George, Forceful Persuasion; Jeffrey Record, "Defeating Desert Storm (and Why Saddam Didn't)," Comparative Strategy 12 (1993): 125-40; and Adam Garfinkle, "The Gulf Wan Was It Worth It?" World & I 6 (1991): 70-79.
96. Charles T. Alan, "Extended Conventional Deterrence: In from the Cold and Out of the Nuclear Freeze," Washington Quarterly 17 (1994): 203-33. See also Alexander George, Forceful Persuasion; Jeffrey Record, "Defeating Desert Storm (and Why Saddam Didn't)," Comparative Strategy 12 (1993): 125-40; and Adam Garfinkle, "The Gulf Wan Was It Worth It?" World & I 6 (1991): 70-79.
97. Charles T. Alan, "Extended Conventional Deterrence: In from the Cold and Out of the Nuclear Freeze," Washington Quarterly 17 (1994): 203-33. See also Alexander George, Forceful Persuasion; Jeffrey Record, "Defeating Desert Storm (and Why Saddam Didn't)," Comparative Strategy 12 (1993): 125-40; and Adam Garfinkle, "The Gulf Wan Was It Worth It?" World & I 6 (1991): 70-79.
98. David Gompert, "How to Defeat Serbia," Foreign Affairs 73 (1994): 30-47, recommended conducting a cold war against Serbia, "one of indefinite duration but certain outcome - while in the meantime using NATO's military power more effectively to ensure that relief reaches Bosnia's innocent victims."
99. New York Times, 17 April 1993, A4.
100. Alan, "Extended Conventional Deterrence."
101. Bloomfield, "The Premature Burial of Global Law and Order," recommends giving the international community's rule book a "sharper set of teeth" by having the UN Genocide Convention, the Fourth Geneva Convention and other laws expanded to cover "slow motion genocide" as in Yugoslavia (157).