Bargaining and the nature of war

Journal of Conflict Resolution

Volumn 48, Issue 6, 2004, Pages 783-813

  Smith, Alastair ^a   Stam, Allan C ^b  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b Dartmouth College   (United States)

Author keywords

Bargaining; Conflict; Military; Random walk model; Warfare

Indexed keywords

EID: 9944238709     PISSN: 00220027     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0022002704268026     Document Type: Review

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