The evolutionary stability of cooperation

American Political Science Review

Volumn 91, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 290-307

  Bendor, Jonathan ^a   Swistak, Piotr ^b  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031528081     PISSN: 00030554     EISSN: 15375943     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2952357     Document Type: Article

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