The path to intractability: Time and the entrenchment of territorial disputes

International Security

Volumn 31, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 107-138

  Hassner, Ron E ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 33847251539     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: 15314804     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/isec.2007.31.3.107     Document Type: Article

References (210)

1. Paul Delaney, "283 Years Later, Dispute over Gibraltar Persists," New York Times, July 30, 1987;
2. and "In Brief: Britain, Spain Discuss Future of Gibraltar," Houston Chronicle, February 5, 2002.
3. In 1998, for example, a Spanish helicopter threatened and damaged a Royal Gibraltar police vessel. Spain closed the border with Gibraltar, and even cut off communication links, in the 1940s, between 1969 and 1985, and again in 1999. Dominique Searle, "British Protest over Gibraltar Fish Clash," Times (London), March 16, 1998;
4. and Sir William G.F. Jackson, The Rock of the Gibraltarians: A History of Gibraltar (Cranbury, N.J.: Associated University Presses, 1987), pp. 317-327.
5. "The Horn in Peril: Ethiopia Must Accept Arbitration Verdict, However Painful," Financial Times (London), June 17, 2003;
6. Deaglen de Bredun, "Cowen Looks for Path to Peace in Boundary War," Irish Times (Dublin), April 7, 2004;
7. and Chris Bunting, "Lines Not Mapped Are Drawn in Blood," Times Higher Education Supplement, July 30, 2004, p. 16.
8. Quoted in Marc Lacey, "Badme Journal: Torn Town Changes Countries, but Not Conviction," New York Times, April 16, 2002.
9. Ian Fisher, "Behind Eritrea-Ethiopia War, a 'Knack for Stubbornness," New York Times, February 14, 1999.
10. Philip Dennis, Gibraltar and Its People (Newton Abbot, U.K.: David and Charles, 1990), pp. 127-137;
11. and Philip Dennis, Gibraltar (Newton Abbot, U.K.: David and Charles, 1977), p. 131.
12. For the Jordanian-Saudi dispute over the location of their common boundary (1922-65), see Paul K. Huth, Standing Your Ground: Territorial Disputes and International Conflict (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), p. 212;
13. and Nadav Safran, Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap, 1985). The dispute over Minquiers and Ecréhous that lasted from 1886 to 1953 (but had thirteenth-century roots) did not affect English or French sovereign rights or fishing rights in the Channel. Huth, Standing Your Ground, p. 205;
14. and Warwick Rodwell, Les Ecréhous, Jersey: History and Archaeology of a Channel Island Archipelago (Jersey, U.K.: Société Jersaise, 1996).
15. The dispute over the Saar region began in 1955, when Germany demanded its reincorporation into Germany, and ended in 1957 when France agreed to German demands. See Huth, Standing Your Ground, p. 208. For the Saudi-Kuwaiti dispute over the neutral zone (1961-65)
16. see ibid., p. 215;
17. and John B. Allcock, Border and Territorial Disputes (Harlow, U.K.: Longman, 1992), p. 79.
18. John A. Vasquex, The War Puzzle. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993);
19. John A. Vasquez and Marie T. Henehan, "Territorial Disputes and the Probability of War, 1816-1992," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 38, No. 2 (March 2001), pp. 123-138;
20. Huth, Standing Your Ground, pp. 4-5;
21. Paul R. Hensel, "Charting a Course to Conflict: Territorial Issues and Interstate Conflict, 1816-1992," in Paul F. Diehl, ed., A Road Map to War: Territorial Dimensions of International Conflict (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1999), pp. 115-146;
22. and Barbara F. Walter, "Explaining the Intractability of Territorial Conflict," International Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 4 (December 2003), pp. 137-153.
23. Ron E. Hassner and Ann Hironaka, "Can Time Heal All Wounds?" paper presented at the annual convention of the International Studies Association, New Orleans, Louisiana, March 24-27, 2002.
24. A credible commitment approach cannot explain why parties that are not in possession of the disputed territory often continue to stake their claims to the territory even as the benefits of occupation for their opponents rise. Expected utility arguments predict that disputes will become entrenched if states act to increase stakes over the course of the dispute, but these arguments run the danger of circularity if they fail to explain states' motives for doing so. Hostility, pride, and revenge arguments are not likely to hold across dispute types or even across cases. Territorial disputes have become more difficult to resolve even when parties did not accumulate resources before the conflict, when the costs of conflict were substantial, and when disputing parties were nondemocratic states enjoying low audience costs.
25. See, for example, Donald Wittman, "How a War Ends: A Rational Model Approach," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 23, No. 4 (December 1979), pp. 743-763;
26. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, "An Expected Utility Theory of International Conflict," American Political Science Review, Vol. 74, No. 4 (December 1980), pp. 917-931;
27. Samuel Vuchinich and Jay Teachman, "Influences on the Duration of Wars, Strikes, Riots, and Family Arguments," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 37, No. 3 (September 1993), pp. 544-568;
28. William Zartman, Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985);
29. and Scott S. Gartner and Gary M. Segura, "War, Casualties, and Public Opinion," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 42, No. 3 (June 1998), pp. 278-300.
30. See, for example, Jeffrey W. Legro, "Military Culture and Inadvertent Escalation in World War II," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring 1994), pp. 108-142;
31. Richard M. Price, The Chemical Weapons Taboo (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997);
32. Michael C. Desch, "Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Summer 1998), pp. 141-170;
33. and Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).
34. Compare Paul F. Diehl, "What Are They Fighting For? The Importance of Issues in International Conflict Research," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 29, No. 3 (August 1992), pp. 333-344;
35. Richard W. Mansbach and John A. Vasquez, "The Effect of Actor and Issue Classifications on the Analysis of Global Conflict-Cooperation," Journal of Politics, Vol. 43, No. 3 (August 1981), pp. 861-874;
36. and John A. Vasquez, "The Tangibility of Issues and Global Conflict: A Test of Rosenau's Issue Area Typology, Journal of Peace Research," Vol. 20, No. 2 (June 1983), pp. 179-192.
37. Contrast Steven J. Brams and Alan D. Taylor, Fair Division: From Cake Cutting to Dispute Resolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
38. The dispute between Saudi Arabia and Iraq over territory along their ill-defined boundary began as a British dispute with the kingdom of Najd. Denmark and Germany's quarrel over Schleswig ended with Denmark receiving northern Schleswig while Germany received central Schleswig. Argentina and Paraguay fought over the Chaco Boreal and the Pilcomayo river before border adjustments concluded the dispute. Finland and the Soviet Union resolved their dispute over East Karelia and Petsamo in similar manner. The dispute between Brazil and Bolivia over Puerto Acre left the territory in Brazilian hands, but Bolivia received monetary compensation and access rights to the sea. Similarly, the dispute between Madagascar and France over the islands of Glorioso, Juan de Nova, Bassas da India, and Europa left them entirely in Madagascar's hands once Madagascar expressed willingness to compensate French companies for their losses. See Huth, Standing Your Ground, pp. 214-215, 219-220;
39. and Alan J. Day, ed., Border and Territorial Disputes of the World (Harlow, U.K.: Longman, 1987), pp. 29, 119-122, 338-339.
40. I thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this dichotomy.
41. The term "homeland" is used here informally to differentiate the core state from disputed territories. For a systematic analysis of the term, see H.E. Goemans, "Bounded Communities: Territoriality, Territorial Attachment, and Conflict," in Miles Kahler and Barbara F. Walter, eds., Territoriality and Conflict in an Era of Globalization (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 25-61.
42. Quantitative analyses have convincingly demonstrated that initial difficulty of resolving these disputes cannot explain their duration. Variables such as the relative power of the contenders and the size, terrain, location, or value of a disputed territory, which are critical in accounting for the onset or escalation of disputes, are statistically insignificant in explaining the disputes' duration or resolution. See Huth, Standing Your Ground, pp. 69-180;
43. Hensel, "Charting a Course to Conflict"; and Hassner and Hironaka, "Can Time Heal All Wounds?" pp. 21-22.
44. "Compliance with Convention on the Chamizal," hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 88th Cong., 2d sess., on S. 2394, January 21, 1964, pp. 5-9;
45. "U.S. and Mexico Agree on Border," New York Times, July 19, 1963;
46. and Sheldon B. Liss, A Century of Disagreement: The Chamizal Conflict, 1864-1964 (Washington, D.C.: University Press of Washington, D.C., 1965), pp. 92-93.
47. Stacie E. Goddard has investigated in detail the manner in which the legitimation of claims to territory during negotiations can produce incompatible positions. See Goddard, "Uncommon Ground: Indivisible Territory and the Politics of Legitimacy," International Organization, Vol. 60, No. 1 (January 2006), pp. 35-68.
48. J.R.V. Prescott, Political Frontiers and Boundaries (London: Allen and Unwin, 1987).
49. As of late 2006, some of the more salient international boundaries that remain undemarcated, in the presence or absence of an ongoing dispute, include those of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Cameroon; Macedonia, Serbia, and Montenegro; Russia and the Ukraine; China and Vietnam; China and Tajikistan; Laos and Thailand; El Salvador and Honduras; Ethiopia and Eritrea; and Syria and Jordan. See the listing of disputes in Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook, 2006, https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/fields/2070.html.
50. Alastair Lamb, The Kashmir Problem: A Historical Survey (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), pp. 22, 146;
51. and Victoria Schofield, Kashmir in the Crossfire (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996), pp. 59, 79.
52. On the official Survey of India map of 1969, for example, the location of the Yangi Dawan pass in the Aksai Chin is accompanied by a question mark, an unusual feature in mapmaking. The survey's uncertainty about the precise location of the pass (or, alternatively, about the precise name of a pass at that location) is remarkable, given the importance of the site as marking the northern-most point of the disputed Indian-Chinese boundary in the Aksai Chin. Twenty-one years later, in the 1990 Survey of India, the extraordinary question mark has disappeared: the site is marked simply as "Yangi Dawan."
53. J.N. Dixit, Anatomy of a Flawed Inheritance: Indo-Pak Relations, 1970-94 (Delhi: Konark, 1995), p. 91.
54. Isaiah Bowman, "The Strategy of Territorial Decisions," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 2 (January 1946), pp. 177-194;
55. Evan Luard, The International Regulation of Frontier Disputes (New York: Praeger, 1970);
56. Vasquez, The War Puzzle; and Hensel, "Charting a Course to Conflict."
57. Nicholas J. Cassavetes, Epirus and Albania (London: G.S. Vellonis, 1919);
58. Edward Capps, Greece, Albania, and Northern Epirus (Chicago: Argonaut, 1963);
59. Louis Sigalos, The Greek Claims on Northern Epirus (Chicago: Argonaut, 1963);
60. Stephen Brook, "The Forgotten War: Nagorno Karabakh," Times (London), June 5, 1993;
61. Thomas de Waal, Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War (New York: New York University Press, 2003);
62. Serge Schmemann, "In the Caucasus, Ancient Blood Feuds Threaten to Engulf 2 New Republics," New York Times, July 8, 1992;
63. Schofield, Kashmir in the Crossfire;
64. Lamb, The Kashmir Problem;
65. and Sumit Ganguly, Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions since 1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001).
66. For the role of memorials, cemeteries, and the cult of the fallen soldier in modern nationalism, see Rudy Koshar, From Monuments to Traces: Artifacts of German Memory, 1870-1990 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000);
67. George L. Mosse, Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990);
68. Reinhart Koselleck and Michael Jeisman, eds., Der Politische Totenkult: Kriegerdenkmäler in der Moderne [The political cult of the dead: War memorials in the modern era] (Munich: Fink, 1994);
69. and George W. White, Nationalism and Territory (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000).
70. Carlos Espinosa, "Exorcising the Demons of War: Memory, Identity, and Honor in the Ecuador-Peru Peace Negotiations," Working Paper, No. 98/99-2 (Cambridge, Mass.: David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies, Harvard University, 1999), pp. 28-29.
71. Gabriel Marcella and Richard Downes, Security Cooperation in the Western Hemisphere: Resolving the Ecuador-Peru Conflict (Miami, Fla.: North-South Center Press, 1999), pp. 233, 244-248.
72. Elie Kedourie, Nationalism (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1960);
73. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983);
74. Eric J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992);
75. Ian S. Lustick, Unsettled States, Disputed Lands: Britain and Ireland, France and Algeria, Israel and the West Bank-Gaza (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993);
76. Ernest Gellner, Nationalism (New York: New York University Press, 1997);
77. Jean Gottman, The Significance of Territory (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1973);
78. and Robert David Sack, Human Territoriality: Its Theory and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
79. For an analysis of territorial expansion driven by developments in the periphery that are beyond the direct control of the great powers involved, see Paul K. MacDonald, "Peripheral Pulls: Great Power Expansion and Lessons for the 'American Empire," paper presented at the annual convention of the International Studies Association, Montreal, Canada, March 17-20, 2004.
80. On the advantages of ambiguity, see, for example, Kenneth A. Shepsle, "The Strategy of Ambiguity - Uncertainty and Electoral Competition," American Political Science Review, Vol. 66, No. 2 (June 1972), pp. 555-568;
81. Benjamin I. Page, "The Theory of Political Ambiguity," American Political Science Review, Vol. 70, No. 3 (September 1976), pp. 742-752;
82. and Charles Lipson, "Why Are Some International Agreements Informal?" International Organization, Vol. 45, No. 4 (Autumn 1991), pp. 495-538.
83. See, for example, Aryeh Shalev, Israel and Syria: Peace and Security on the Golan (Jerusalem: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1994);
84. Itamar Rabinovich, The Brink of Peace: The Israeli-Syrian Negotiations, 1992-1996 (Tel Aviv: Yediot Aharonot, 1998);
85. and Moshe Maoz, ed., The Golan: Between War and Peace (Or Yehuda, Israel: Hed Arzi, 1999). For a critical summary of contrasting accounts, drawing on Israeli "new history,"
86. see Jerome Slater, "Lost Opportunities for Peace in the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Israel and Syria, 1948-2001," International Security, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Summer 2002), pp. 79-106.
87. Matitiahu Mayzel, "The Israeli-Syrian Border on the Golan Heights," in Maoz, The Golan, p. 604;
88. Moshe Maoz, Syria and Israel: from War to Peacemaking (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), p. 102;
89. and Moshe Maoz and Avner Yaniv, Syria under Assad: Domestic Constraints and Regional Risks (London: Croom Helm, 1986), p. 169.
90. Contrast Slater, "Lost Opportunities for Peace in the Arab-Israeli Conflict," pp. 84-92.
91. Aryeh Naor, Greater Israel: Theology and Policy (Haifa: University of Haifa Press and ZmoraBitan, 2001), p. 36.
92. Rabinovich, The Brink of Peace, p. 591.
93. William Wilson Harris, Taking Root: Israeli Settlement in the West Bank, the Golan, and Gaza-Sinai, 1967-1980 (Chichester, U.K.: Research Studies Press, 1980), p. 60.
94. Ibid., pp. 43-83.
95. Shalev, Israel and Syria, p. 70.
96. Yehiel Admoni, Decade of Discretion: Settlement Policy in the Territories, 1967-1977 (Yad Tevenkin, Israel: Galili Institute/Kibbutz Hameuhad, 1992), p. 32.
97. Ibid., p. 85.
98. Ibid., p. 98.
99. Uri Davis, "The Golan Heights under Israeli Occupation, 1967-1981," Occasional Paper, No. 18 (Durham, U.K.: Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, University of Durham, 1983), p. 46.
100. Adam Garfinkle, War, Water, and Negotiations in the Middle East: The Case of the Palestine-Syria Border, 1916-1923 (Tel Aviv: Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 1994), pp. 143-144;
101. Frederic C. Hof, "The Line of June 4, 1967," Middle East Insight, Vol. 14, No. 5 (September/October 1999), pp. 1-9;
102. Admoni, Decade of Discretion, p. 74;
103. Maoz, Syria and Israel, p. 113;
104. Avi Degani and Moshe Inbar, eds., Land of the Golan and Hermon (Jerusalem: Ministry of Defense, 1993), p. 612;
105. and Harris, Taking Root, p. 196.
106. Data are based on a search of UN documents at the United Nations website, http://www.un.org/search/.
107. Map of the Cease-Fire Lines: Israel, scale 1:1,000,000 (Survey of Israel, Tel Aviv, 1973);
108. The October War, scale 1:1,700,000 and 1:2,750,000 (Karta, Jerusalem, 1974);
109. Israel Touring Map, scale 1:250,000 (Survey of Israel, Tel Aviv, 1977);
110. Israel Touring Map, scale 1:250,000 (Survey of Israel, Tel Aviv, 1976, partly revised 1995);
111. Syria and Lebanon, scale 1:750,000 (Department of Military Surveying, Damascus, 1971);
112. Syria and Lebanon, scale 1:750,000 (Department of Military Surveying, Damascus, 1977);
113. Syria: Carte Routière et Touristique, scale 1:1,000,000 (unknown, Syria, 1986);
114. Syria: Carte Routière et Touristique, scale 1:1,000,000 (unknown, Syria, 1990);
115. and Syria and Lebanon, scale 1:750,000 (Department of Military Surveying, Damascus, 1990).
116. Gideon Biger, "The Political Delimitation of the Golan Heights during the Mandate Period, 1918-1948," in Degani and Inbar, Land of the Golan and Hermon, p. 583;
117. and Naor, Greater Israel, pp. 80, 227.
118. Harris, Taking Root, pp. 81, 123;
119. Naor, Greater Israel, pp. 161, 239;
120. Maoz, Syria and Israel, p. 212;
121. and Maoz., The Golan, pp. 213-214.
122. Maoz, Syria and Israel, pp. 212, 251;
123. Rabinovich, The Brink of Peace;
124. and Slater, "Lost Opportunities for Peace," pp. 95-103
125. citing Helena Cobban, The Israeli Syrian Peace Talks: 1991-96 and Beyond (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999).
126. Ilana Shamir, Commemoration and Remembrance: Israel's Way of Molding Its Collective Memory Patterns (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1996).
127. Rabinovich, The Brink of Peace, p. 40;
128. and Cobban, The Israeli-Syrian Peace Talks, p. 33.
129. Karsten Prager, John Stacks, Dean Fischer, William Dowell, and Lara Marlowe, "Hafez Assad: Land before Peace," Time, November 30, 1992, p. 61.
130. Patrick Seale, Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East (London: I.B.Tauris, 1988), p. 211.
131. "Fresh Light on the Syrian-Israeli Peace Negotiations: An Interview with Ambassador Walid al-Moualem," Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Winter 1997), pp. 86-87, 90.
132. Speech to the Syrian Federation of Professional Workers, December 13, 1992, as quoted in Rabinovich, The Brink of Peace, p. 108 (my translation).
133. Dan P. Silverman, Reluctant Union: Alsace-Lorraine and Imperial Germany, 1871-1918 (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1972);
134. and Barry Cerf, Alsace-Lorraine since 1870 (New York: Macmillan, 1919).
135. Laird Boswell, "Franco-Alsatian Conflict and the Crisis of National Sentiment during the Phony War," Journal of Modern History, Vol. 71, No. 3 (September 1999), pp. 556-557.
136. Cerf, Alsace-Lorraine since 1870, p. 22. Buelow is cited by Silverman, Reluctant Union, p. 200
137. from Anton Nystrom, Elsass-Lothringen und die Möglichkeit einer Deutsch-Französischen Allianz [Alsace-Lorraine and the possibility of a German-French alliance] (Berlin, 1904), p. 76.
138. The imperial German law of June 1871 similarly proclaimed, "Alsace-Lorraine is the price of combats in which all the German states have shed their blood, the pledge of the unity of the German Empire conquered by its united forces." Cerf, Alsace-Lorraine since 1870, p. 23.
139. Gershom Gorenberg recently questioned the extent to which the Israeli government acted in good faith to prevent the establishment of illicit settlements in Palestinian population centers. Without claiming that Israel's leadership desired or encouraged settlement in Palestinian cities, he argues that several cabinet members were ambivalent toward the prohibition and that at least one cabinet member, Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon, tacitly supported the settlers. Gorenberg, The Accidental Empire: Israel and the Birth of the Settlements, 1967-1977 (New York: Times Books, 2006).
140. Contrast Haggai Segal, Dear Brothers: The West Bank Jewish Underground (New York: Beit-Shamai, 1988);
141. David J. Schnall, Beyond the Green Line: Israeli Settlements West of the Jordan (New York: Praeger, 1984);
142. Efraim Ben-Zadok, "The Limits of the Politics of Planning," in David Newman, ed., The Impact of Gush Emunim: Politics and Settlement in the West Bank (London: Croom Helm, 1985), pp. 142-145;
143. and Mordechai Nisan, Israel and the Territories: A Study in Control, 1967-1977 (Ramat Can, Israel: Turtledove, 1978), pp. 151-154.
144. Ehud Sprinzak, The Ascendance of Israel's Radical Right (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 46-47, 61, 89-90, 113-145;
145. Tsvi Raanan, Gush Emunim (Tel Aviv: Vered, 1980), pp. 142-144;
146. and Ian S. Lustick, For the Land and the Lord: Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1988), pp. 43-46.
147. Huth, Standing Your Ground, pp. 209-210, 217;
148. and Day, Border and Territorial Disputes, pp. 203-207.
149. Honduras and the United States quarreled over a lease that the latter had obtained to the Swan Islands, three islands in the Caribbean. In 1971 the United States unilaterally renounced its claim to the islands. Qatar and Bahrain disagreed over ownership of the Hawar Islands and nearly came to blows in 1986. In 2001 the International Court of Justice ruled in favor of Bahrain, and Qatar withdrew its claim. See Huth, Standing Your Ground, pp. 201, 214;
150. Day, Border and Territorial Disputes, pp. 119-122, 212-213;
151. and Peter Calvert, ed., Border and Territorial Disputes of the World (London: John Harper, 2004), pp. 453-456.
152. Perejil/Leila is a minute rocky island, 200 feet off the coast of Morocco. The Turkish-Greek dispute over the islands of Imia/Kardak, totaling ten acres in area, led to violent exchanges and shows of force after a Greek flag was raised on one of the islands. See Day, Border and Territorial Disputes, pp. 46-51, 150-154;
153. Huth, Standing Your Ground, pp. 222;
154. and Calvert, Border and Territorial Disputes of the World, pp. 51-55, 310-319.
155. See M. Taylor Fravel, "Regime Insecurity and International Cooperation: Explaining China's Compromises in Territorial Disputes," International Security, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Fall 2005), pp. 61-62;
156. Melvin Samuels, Contest for the South China Sea (New York: Methuen, 1982);
157. Lu Ning, Flashpoint Spratlys! (Singapore: Dolphin, 1995);
158. and Allcock, Border and Territorial Disputes, pp. 542-545.
159. Japan was forced to renounce all claims to the Spratlys and other disputed territories after World War II as part of the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty. Calvert, Border and Territorial Disputes of the World, p. 203.
160. Allcock, Border and Territorial Disputes, p. 545.
161. Philip C. Jessup, "Sovereignty in Antarctica," American Journal of International Law, Vol. 41, No. 1 (January 1947), pp. 117-119;
162. Peter J. Beck, "International Relations in Antarctica: Argentina, Chile, and the Great Powers," in Michael A. Morris, ed., Great Power Relations in Argentina, Chile, and Antarctica (New York: St. Martin's, 1990), pp. 101-130;
163. and Prescott, Political Frontiers and Boundaries, pp. 301-302.
164. The "sector principle" allocates rights to newly discovered areas based on corresponding meridians of sovereign territory nearby.
165. M.J. Peterson, "Antarctica: The Last Great Land Rush on Earth," International Organization, Vol. 34, No. 3 (Summer 1980), pp. 377-403. As a result, the first Antarctican on record, Emilio Palma, was born in 1978 in Argentina's Esperanza Base. Beck, "International Relations in Antarctica," p. 113.
166. Beck, "International Relations in Antarctica," pp. 112-113.
167. Mary Jeanne Reid Martz, The Central American Soccer War: Historical Patterns and Internal Dynamics of OAS Settlement Procedures, Papers in International Studies Latin America Series, No. 4 (Athens: Center for International Studies, Ohio University, 1978);
168. Day, Border and Territorial Disputes, pp. 372-373;
169. William H. Durham, Scarcity and Survival in Central America: Ecological Origins of the Soccer War (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1979);
170. and Thomas P. Anderson, The War of the Dispossessed: Honduras and El Salvador, 1969 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1981).
171. Anderson, The War of the Dispossessed, pp. 42-43, 71;
172. and Durham, Scarcity and Survival in Central America, pp. 57-58.
173. On the interaction between the boundary dispute and the immigration problem, see Anderson, The War of the Dispossessed, p. 80;
174. and Durham, Scarcity and Survival in Central America, pp. 2, 169-170.
175. Alastair Lamb, Incomplete Partition: The Genesis of the Kashmir Dispute (Hertingfordbury, U.K.: Roxford, 1997), p. 348;
176. Ganguly, Conflict Unending, p. 5;
177. Dixit, Anatomy of a Flawed Inheritance, p. 201;
178. Raju G.C. Thomas, "Reflections on the Kashmir Problem," in Thomas, ed., Perspectives on Kashmir: The Roots of Conflict in South Asia (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1992), pp. 11-12;
179. and Josef Korbel, Danger in Kashmir (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 30.
180. Robert I. Crane, ed., Area Handbook on Jammu and Kashmir State (Chicago: Division of the Social Sciences, University of Chicago, 1956), pp. 113-114, 121-122;
181. Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, p. 202;
182. John King and Bradley Mayhew, Karakoram Highway (Hawthorn, Australia: Lonely Planet, 1998), p. 17;
183. Vernon Hewitt, Towards the Future? Jammu and Kashmir in the Twenty-first Century (Cambridge: Portland, 2001), p. 20;
184. "Our News Letter," Kashmir, Vol. 4, No. 9 (October 1954) (India: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Publications Division, Government of India, 1954);
185. Robert Bradnock and Roma Bradnock, South Asian Handbook (Bath, U.K.: Trade and Travel, 1993), p. 488;
186. and Gowher Rizvi, "India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir Problem, 1947-1972," in Thomas, Perspectives on Kashmir, p. 63.
187. These negotiations included proposals to exchange Kashmir for Junagadh and Hyderabad in 1948, offers in 1949 and 1956 to divide Kashmir along the cease-fire line, discussions of a plebiscite in 1953, Pakistani proposals to demilitarize Kashmir in 1957, serious negotiations over the partition of Kashmir in 1962 and 1963, and a secret agreement (never implemented) for the de facto partitioning of Kashmir along the Line of Control in 1972. See Šumit Ganguly, The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War, Hopes of Peace (Princeton, N.J.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1997), pp. 45-48;
188. Ganguly, Conflict Unending, pp. 18-19, 25, 33, 71;
189. Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, p. 89;
190. Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, "Pakistan, India, and Kashmir: A Historical Review," in Thomas, Perspectives on Kashmir, pp. 102,114;
191. Schofield, Kashmir in the Crossfire, p. 212;
192. Thomas, Perspectives on Kashmir, p. 21;
193. Rizvi, "India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir Problem, 1947-1972" pp. 58-63;
194. A.G. Noorani, "Disservice to Truth," Frontline, Vol. 19, No. 24 (November 23-December 6, 2002), http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl1924/ stories/20021206001107400.htm;
195. and Lamb, The Kashmir Problem, p. 102.
196. Ursel Clausen, Der Konflikt um die Westsahara [The conflict over Western Sahara] (Hamburg: Institut für Afrika-Kunde, 1978), pp. 2-3;
197. and Tony Hodges, "The Western Saharans," Minority Rights Group Report, No. 40 (London: Minority Rights Group, 1984), pp. 3-4.
198. Day, Border and Territorial Disputes, p. 166;
199. John Damis, Conflict in Northwest Africa: The Western Sahara Dispute (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1983), pp. 59-66;
200. and Jerome B. Weiner, "The Green March in Historical Perspective," Middle East Journal, Vol. 33, No. 1 (Winter 1979), pp. 20-33.
201. Estimates for the number of Sahrawi refugees range between 15,000 and 100,000. Hodges, "The Western Saharans," p. 10;
202. Damis, Conflict in Northwest Africa, p. 41;
203. and Thomas M. Franck, "The Stealing of the Sahara," American Journal of International Law, Vol. 70, No. 4 (October 1976), pp. 695-696.
204. Damis, Conflict in Northwest Africa, pp. 12, 96-98.
205. As a result, only half as many settlements sprouted in the Sinai compared with the Golan in the first decade after the 1967 Six-Day War, a mere thirteen settlements spread over an area forty times the size. By 1978 the Sinai Peninsula formed neither a cohesive unit of interconnected settlements nor a landmass integrated into Israel's heartland. It remained, as it had been before 1967, a vast wilderness inhabited mainly by nomadic Bedouin tribes.
206. See George Gavrilis, "Sharon's Endgame for the West Bank Barrier," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Autumn 2004), pp. 7-20;
207. and Barry Rubin, "Israel's New Strategy," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 4 (July/August 2006), pp. 111-125.
208. The most obvious comparison is with the literature on the punctuated resolution of enduring rivalries. Paul F. Diehl and Gary Goertz, War and Peace in International Rivalry (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000), p. 132;
209. and Claudio Cioffi-Revilla, "The Political Uncertainty of Interstate Rivalries: A Punctuated Equilibrium Model," in Diehl, The Dynamics of Enduring Rivalries (Urban, III.: University of Chicago Press, 1998), pp. 64-97.
210. Compare Ian Lustick's argument regarding the necessary conditions for shifts in hegemonic ideas about territory. Lustick, Unsettled States, Disputed Lands.