Mediation in situations of conflict and limited commitment

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

Volumn 21, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 467-500

  Mitusch, Kay ^a   Strausz, Roland ^b  

^a TECHNISCHE UNIVERSITÄT BERLIN   (Germany)

^b FREIE UNIVERSITÄT BERLIN   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 25144435512     PISSN: 87566222     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewi018     Document Type: Article

References (22)

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