Deterrence and international conflict: Empirical findings and theoretical debates

Annual Review of Political Science

Volumn 2, Issue , 1999, Pages 25-48

  Huth, Paul K ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

Author keywords

Credible threats; Deterrence; Prevention of war and crises; Rational choice

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033474253     PISSN: 10942939     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.2.1.25     Document Type: Review

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