Introduction to judgment aggregation

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 145, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 441-466

  List, Christian ^a   Polak, Ben ^b  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

^b YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Arrow's theorem; Escape routes; Judgment aggregation

Indexed keywords

EID: 77949485663     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2010.02.001     Document Type: Article

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