Collective coherence?

International Review of Law and Economics

Volumn 21, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 197-211

  Brennan, Geoffrey ^a  

^a AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0012491074     PISSN: 01448188     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0144-8188(01)00056-4     Document Type: Article

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