Aggregation of binary evaluations with abstentions

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 145, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 544-561

  Dokow, Elad ^a   Holzman, Ron ^a  

^a TECHNION ISRAEL INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (Israel)

Author keywords

Abstention; Aggregation; Arrow's impossibility; Judgment; Social choice

Indexed keywords

EID: 77949490739     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2009.10.015     Document Type: Article

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