The probability of inconsistencies in complex collective decisions

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 24, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 3-32

  List, Christian ^a,b  

^a Res Sch Social Sci   (Australia)

^b LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 17444371710     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-003-0253-7     Document Type: Article

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