Arrow's theorem as a corollary

Economics Letters

Volumn 80, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 379-382

  Nehring, Klaus ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Independence of irrelevant alternatives; Preference aggregation; S3 convex structure

Indexed keywords

EID: 0042531963     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-1765(03)00118-6     Document Type: Article

References (11)

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6. Nehring, K., Puppe, C., 2002. Strategy-proof social choice on single-peaked domains: possibility, impossibility, and the space between, mimeo. Available at http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/nehring/
7. Nehring, K., Puppe, C., 2003. Non-binary Arrowian aggregation, in preparation.
8. Reny P. Arrow's theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: a unified approach Economics Letters 70 2001 99-105
9. Satterthwaite M. Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions Journal of Economic Theory 10 1975 187-217
10. Sethuraman, J., Teo, C., Vohra, R., 2001. Integer programming and Arrowian social welfare functions, mimeo Northwestern.
11. Van de Vel, M., 1993, Theory of Convex Structures, North Holland.